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ABSTRACT 
  Though international criminal justice has flourished over the last 
two decades, scholars have neglected institutional design and 
procedure questions. International-criminal-procedure scholarship 
has developed in isolation from its domestic counterpart but could 
learn much realism from it. Given its current focus on atrocities like 
genocide, international criminal law’s main purpose should be not 
only to inflict retribution but also to restore wounded communities by 
bringing the truth to light. The international justice system needs more 
ideological balance, stable career paths, and civil-service expertise. It 
should also draw on the American experience of federalism to 
cultivate cooperation with national authorities and select fewer cases 
for international prosecution. Revised plea bargaining and sentencing 
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rules could learn from American experience and pitfalls, husbanding 
scarce resources and minimizing haggling, yet still buying needed 
cooperation. Finally, in blending adversarial and inquisitorial 
systems, international criminal justice has jettisoned too many 
safeguards of either one. It should reform discovery, speedy-trial 
rules, witness preparation, cross-examination, and victims’ rights in 
light of domestic experience. Just as international criminal law can 
benefit from domestic realism, domestic law could incorporate more 
international idealism and accountability, creating healthy political 
pressures to discipline and publicize enforcement decisions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
After the world had spent years and millions bringing him to 
court for genocide and war crimes, Slobodan Milošević cheated 
justice. The butcher of the Balkans died unexpectedly in his holding 
cell in 2006, as his four-year trial was drawing to a close but before 
verdict and sentence. Proceedings were slow and costly; as of 
Milošević’s death, hundreds of people had been charged but only 
dozens had been convicted, clogging the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).1 By pursuing exhaustive 
justice against his henchmen, the ICTY had denied Bosnian Muslims, 
Croats, and Serbs the most basic justice of seeing Milošević convicted 
and punished swiftly and publicly. 
Milošević’s case, although extreme, is not unique.2 It epitomizes 
deeper problems with international criminal justice. Fired by idealism 
and the laudable legacy of the post–World War II Nuremberg 
Tribunal, the United Nations (UN) and Western nations began 
setting up international criminal tribunals in the early 1990s. In 1993 
and 1994, the UN Security Council created the ICTY and its sister 
court, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).3 The 
UN, in cooperation with national governments, created other hybrid 
tribunals that blend international and domestic legal approaches in 
partnerships with nations such as Sierra Leone, Lebanon, Cambodia, 
East Timor, and Bosnia.4 In 2002, the Rome Statute created the first 
permanent international criminal court, the International Criminal 
Court (ICC).5 In 2009, the ICC dared to issue an arrest warrant for a 
sitting head of state, Omar Bashir of Sudan, for his role in the Darfur 
 
 1. See Vesna Peric Zimonjic & David Randall, ‘Justice Cheated’ as Milosevic Is Found 
Dead in His Prison Cell, INDEPENDENT (London), Mar. 12, 2006, at 2; Editorial, The Death of 
Milosevic, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2006, at A26. 
 2. In late 2008, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda convicted Colonel 
Bagosora for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes fourteen years after the fact, 
after a six-year trial involving 242 witnesses. See Lydia Polgreen, Senior Rwandan Officer and 
Two Accomplices Are Found Guilty of 1994 Genocide, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2008, at A11. 
 3. S.C. Res. 827, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) (establishing the ICTY); S.C. 
Res. 955, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) (establishing the ICTR). 
 4. For a discussion of these hybrid tribunals, see William W. Burke-White, A Community 
of Courts: Toward a System of International Criminal Law Enforcement, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 
30–61 (2003). 
 5. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court pmbl., July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
90 (entered into force July 1, 2002). 
BIBAS & BURKE-WHITE IN FINAL 12/15/2009 11:42:20 AM 
640 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:637 
genocide.6 But the idealistic plans of all these tribunals are foundering 
on practical shoals, overwhelmed by hundreds of cases and protracted 
proceedings. Their substantive aspirations have not been built upon 
solid, realistic procedural foundations. 
More generally, international criminal law has reinvented the 
wheel. Though scholarship in this growing field has flourished since 
the early 1990s,7 it has not engaged with its counterparts in American 
or European criminal procedure.8 Thus, international- and domestic-
 
 6. See Prosecutor v. Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Warrant of Arrest for Omar 
Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ¶ 21 (Mar. 4, 2009), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/ 
doc639078.pdf. Notably, the arrest warrant for Bashir includes war crimes and crimes against 
humanity, but not genocide charges due to the difficulty of winning a genocide conviction. 
 7. In the United States, international criminal law scholarship has focused on the forms of 
responsibility, the morality of justice, and the establishment of international tribunals, rather 
than on the structures and procedures on which this Article focuses. See generally MARTHA 
MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS (1998) (discussing the moral choices of 
post-conflict justice); RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (2000) (discussing the moral 
underpinnings of transitional justice); José E. Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons 
from Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 365 (1999) (considering how the ICTR affected the Rwandan 
judiciary); Burke-White, supra note 4 (examining the impact of hybrid courts); Allison Marston 
Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command 
Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93 CAL. L. REV. 75 (2005) 
(examining forms of criminal responsibility); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Transitional 
Justice as Ordinary Justice, 117 HARV. L. REV. 761 (2004) (considering justice in times of 
transition); Michael P. Scharf, The ICC’s Jurisdiction over the Nationals of Non-Party States: A 
Critique of the U.S. Position, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 67 (2001) (analyzing the United 
States’ position on jurisdiction under the ICC and its potential ramifications); Jenia Iontcheva 
Turner, Transnational Networks and International Criminal Justice, 105 MICH. L. REV. 985 
(2007) (focusing on network effects among tribunals); Laura A. Dickinson, Note, The Promise 
of Hybrid Courts, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 295 (2003) (examining hybrid tribunals). In Europe, the 
discipline has focused on substantive crimes and doctrinal interpretation. See generally 
GUÉNAËL METTRAUX, INTERNATIONAL CRIMES AND THE AD HOC TRIBUNALS (2005) 
(considering the definitions of international crimes); William Schabas, National Courts Finally 
Begin to Prosecute Genocide, the ‘Crime of Crimes,’ 1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 39 (2003) (discussing 
national court interpretations of genocide). 
 8. See generally LEILA NADYA SADAT, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: JUSTICE FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM (2002) 
(exploring some ICC rules of procedure); 2 I N T E R NAT I O NA L  C R I M I NA L  L AW: 
P R O C E D U R A L  A N D  E N F O R C E M E N T  M E C H A N I S M S  ( M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2d ed. 
1 9 9 9 )  ( e x p l a i n i n g  p r oc e d ur a l  i s s u es, but  w i t h o u t  a  co m p a r a t i v e  a n a l y s i s  o f  
d o m es t i c  pr ac t i c e) ; Máximo Langer, The Rise of Managerial Judging in International 
Criminal Law, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 835 (2005) (addressing comparative criminal procedure in 
international tribunals); Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56 STAN. 
L. REV. 429 (2003) (considering the development of international judicial institutions, but 
without reference to criminal procedure); M i c h ae l  P. S c h ar f, Trading Justice for Efficiency: 
Plea-Bargaining and International Tribunals, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1070 (2004) (considering 
plea bargaining before international courts, but with only limited domestic comparative 
analysis); Sonja B. Starr, Rethinking “Effective Remedies”: Remedial Deterrence in International 
Courts, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693 (2008) (considering how certain procedures influence the 
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criminal-procedure scholarship have developed independently and 
failed to learn from each other. 
Though the international and domestic settings differ 
substantially, international and domestic enforcement and procedure 
share much in common. The scholarly gap between the two fields is 
especially glaring on issues of institutional design and structural 
constraints. Substantive domestic criminal law has occasionally 
influenced substantive international law and vice versa, when national 
courts have enforced international law.9 But international criminal 
procedure has largely overlooked the structural, institutional, and 
political lessons it could glean from domestic-criminal-procedure 
scholarship.10 
Bringing the lessons of domestic criminal law to international 
criminal law promises to illuminate and advance international 
scholarship. International scholars have thrived on dreams of 
subjugating politics to law and holding the worst of the worst 
accountable.11 Although these dreams have spurred the development 
of international criminal courts, they have hindered systemic and 
political analysis of how these systems actually work. In contrast, 
domestic American procedural scholarship has dissected the systemic 
factors, rational actors, incentives, and institutional design choices 
that shape domestic criminal enforcement.12 We hope to inject a 
 
deterrent effect of international tribunals); Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Nationalizing International 
Criminal Law, 41 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1 (2005) (examining the domestication of international 
criminal law and possibilities for state cooperation, but not directly engaging with procedural 
issues). 
 9. See William W. Burke-White, Proactive Complementarity: The International Criminal 
Court and National Courts in the Rome System of International Justice, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 53, 
106–07 (2008) (considering the domestic application of the ICC Rome Statute by Congolese 
courts). 
 10. For the few articles that have addressed procedural issues, see Langer, supra note 8, at 
847–53; Scharf, supra note 8, at 1074–80; Turner, supra note 8, at 30–51. 
 11. See, e.g., GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF 
WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS 1–36, 147–205 (2000) (discussing the idealist motivations for 
international criminal justice); Stephen Krasner, Pitfalls of International Idealism, 8 UCLA J. 
INT’L L. & FOR. AFF. 61 passim (2003) (describing international criminal justice as part of a 
movement toward “international idealism,” according to which “normative structures can 
constrain state behavior, and that if we could get these normative structures built into the 
international system, the world would be a better place”). 
 12. The master of this institutional understanding of criminal procedure is William Stuntz. 
See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
780, 791–818 (2006) (arguing that constitutional overregulation of criminal procedure leads to 
pathological political phenomena, such as overpunishment and discriminatory prosecution); 
William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. 
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needed note of realism into idealistic international aspirations as the 
ICC comes of age. 
Our aim is to show how the lessons of domestic, especially 
American, criminal procedure can make international criminal justice 
more effective. Part I provides an overview of the two systems, to set 
the stage for comparisons and contrasts. Part II examines the mindset 
and Part III considers the politics of international criminal justice. 
Part IV draws lessons for international case management, and Part V 
offers similar lessons for pretrial and trial procedures. 
We begin in Part I with a bird’s-eye view of the functions and 
goals of the two systems. International criminal justice could in theory 
pursue transnational crimes or crimes that national governments will 
not prosecute, but in practice targets the most severe atrocities such 
as genocide. American federal criminal enforcement targets some 
crimes that states will not prosecute and used to focus on interstate 
crimes, but the federal system increasingly is handling many of the 
most serious crimes. Pragmatic considerations, such as resources and 
interest, drive federal jurisdiction rather than abstract, theoretical 
categories of interstate commerce. In both systems, these functions of 
justice determine the purposes of punishment. Domestic criminal law 
 
REV. 2548, 2550–58 (2004) (arguing that law has less effect on plea bargains than do voters’ and 
prosecutors’ preferences, budget constraints, and other forces); William J. Stuntz, The 
Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 523–29, 533–39 (2001) (arguing 
that politics and prosecutorial discretion lead to increasingly broad criminal law and harsher 
criminal punishment); William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure 
and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 6–22, 65–74 (1997) (identifying problems with the current 
allocation of power between courts and legislatures in the criminal justice system and 
recommending a constitutional solution focused on criminal substance, not criminal procedure). 
Others have contributed significant scholarship in this vein. See, e.g., GEORGE FISHER, PLEA 
BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA 40–61 (2003) 
(discussing plea bargaining’s rise and its effect on criminal enforcement); Rachel E. Barkow, 
Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. 
L. REV. 869, 876–84, 895–97 (2009) (discussing the enormous discretion of federal prosecutors 
and recommending separation of investigators and advocates from adjudicators); Stephanos 
Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2481–82, 2483–85, 
2469–519 (2004) (arguing that plea bargains are made in the shadow of factors beyond the 
expected outcome at trials, such as attorney competence, sentencing rules, and psychological 
biases); Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2117, 2121–23 (1998) (highlighting how America’s heavy reliance on plea bargaining has begun 
to resemble a nonadversarial, administrative justice system); Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and 
Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 755–94 (2003) (describing 
how the interaction between federal prosecutors and federal enforcement agents affects 
enforcement discretion); Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 
STAN. L. REV. 29, 48–58 (2002) (discussing prosecutorial screening as an alternative to plea 
bargaining). 
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seeks primarily to deter, incapacitate, and inflict retribution. 
International criminal law has largely sought to ensure retribution as 
well as international peace and security. But so long as it focuses on 
the gravest atrocities, international law must also emphasize 
restorative justice to heal the wounds of genocide and war. These 
functional choices must inform how we understand and improve each 
system’s procedural structures. Next, we quickly sketch the key 
institutional features that make international criminal law political 
and often ineffective and the ones that make domestic law more 
efficient but also more insulated and amoral. 
Parts II through V then apply the lessons of recent domestic-
criminal-procedure scholarship to improve international criminal 
tribunals’ effectiveness. We look primarily to American criminal 
procedure because its federal structure resembles the international 
layers of authority and because it has well-developed case 
management techniques. Part II explores the mentality of 
international justice. International lawyers often view criminal justice 
as taming power through law, so courts need to seek lawyers with 
more diverse and less biased ideologies. International-civil-service 
reforms and secondments of domestic lawyers and judges could 
address excessive staff turnover. 
Part III delves into the problematic politics of international 
justice and what it could learn from less-political domestic justice. 
International mechanisms of appointment and reappointment can 
leave prosecutors and judges insufficiently insulated from political 
pressures. Because international prosecutors lack their own police 
forces, they must rely on state cooperation to secure evidence, 
interview witnesses, and make arrests. And international courts’ 
budgets are set through overtly political processes, which can press 
courts to please key funders. Moreover, defense lawyers face financial 
incentives to underlitigate cases. Domestic experiences illuminate 
how one could insulate courts’ budgets and perhaps give defense 
lawyers parity of resources. Other problems in international justice 
are unavoidable; at best, we can recognize and minimize them. 
Part IV focuses on the need for international case management. 
International prosecutors have a nearly limitless universe of potential 
cases but time and resources for only a few. The ICTY pursued too 
many low-level cases only to clog the system and delay justice for 
Milošević and other leaders, a failure that the ICC seeks to remedy. 
Domestic courts have much experience with gatekeeping and sorting. 
Triage mechanisms can select only those individuals most responsible, 
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whose convictions would best serve restorative justice, and refer 
lesser cases to national courts and motivate them to pursue them. 
Another way to manage caseloads is through plea bargaining, which, 
given international criminal justice’s purposes, must be transparent 
and limited. Cooperation agreements can purchase testimony to bring 
ringleaders to justice but require stronger safeguards. And more 
consistent sentencing policies can prevent arbitrary disparities 
between international and national sentences for the same conduct. 
Part V considers procedural safeguards more broadly. Current 
international procedures are an uneasy hybrid of inquisitorial and 
adversarial systems without the essential checks of either one. 
Surprisingly, there are few limits on witness coaching, and rules on 
speedy trials and victims’ rights are too weak. The rules of discovery 
and cross-examination are inadequate to prevent tampering with 
witnesses and fabricating evidence. Domestic criminal procedure 
offers helpful guidance for how to redesign these rules. 
The Conclusion draws together the lessons that domestic 
criminal procedure can offer international criminal law. It then 
considers the converse question—namely, how can domestic criminal 
procedure learn from international law’s idealism and politics? 
Specifically, one of international law’s strengths and domestic law’s 
weaknesses is accountability and oversight. Official reporting to 
intergovernmental bodies, the demands of cooperation with nations, 
and nongovernmental organization (NGO) monitoring all constrain 
international prosecutors and provide transparency. Similar 
mechanisms could better check domestic prosecutorial discretion and 
make it more legitimate. There might even be ways to infuse more of 
international lawyers’ idealistic mindset, leavening the often cynical 
mindset of many domestic prosecutors, defense counsel, and judges. 
I.  COMPARING DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 
To draw lessons for international criminal justice from domestic 
criminal procedure, one must understand their many similarities and 
differences. We first consider the functions and then the penological 
purposes of international and domestic criminal justice. Finally, we 
provide an overview of how each system is structured and works, 
noting particularly how both systems seek to achieve common ends. 
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A. The Functions of International and Domestic Criminal Justice 
As a newly created system, international criminal law could have 
performed any number of distinct functions. It could have prosecuted 
crimes that span national jurisdictions, ensured accountability when 
national governments failed to act, or prosecuted the most significant 
crimes regardless of where they occurred. We call these the 
transnational, backstop, and atrocity functions, respectively. The 
choice of function determines the goals and purposes of punishment 
and should also influence key procedural rules. This Section briefly 
explores those functional choices and analogizes them to the 
functions of both state and federal criminal justice systems in the 
United States. 
Perhaps international criminal law should naturally have fought 
supranational crimes that span jurisdictions, such as human 
smuggling, drug trafficking, intellectual and maritime piracy, and 
international terrorism. After all, national governments usually 
cooperate internationally when they share common functional 
needs.13 Investigating and prosecuting transnational crimes requires 
multiple governments to coordinate efforts. Thus, international 
criminal law originated with universal jurisdiction over piracy, the 
quintessential transnational crime.14 If this transnational emphasis had 
continued, international tribunals and procedures would have 
spanned a very different set of substantive crimes. Some crimes would 
have been less severe, and some of the wrongdoers would have been 
much less culpable than others. What these crimes would all have 
shared is a need for states to cooperate in stamping them out. 
Secondly, international criminal law could have served as a 
backstop, holding wrongdoers accountable when national 
governments were unable or unwilling to act themselves. This 
supplementary function would have been a logical response to state 
 
 13. See generally ERNST B. HAAS, THE UNITING OF EUROPE: POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND 
ECONOMIC FORCES 1950–57 (1958) (describing various aspects of the integration of European 
countries in the 1950s). 
 14. As Justice Story wrote: “A pirate is deemed, and properly deemed, hostis humani 
generis” (an enemy of all mankind). Harmony v. United States (The Brig Malek Adhel), 43 U.S. 
(2 How.) 210, 232 (1844); see also Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under 
International Law, 66 TEX. L. REV. 785, 791–98 (1988). As Eugene Kontorovich has argued, 
piracy jurisdiction did not rest on the view that piracy was an atrocity or an especially heinous 
crime. Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction’s Hollow 
Foundation, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 183, 186 (2004). 
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weakness or failure15 or to governmental culpability. This function 
might have led to international jurisdiction over all crimes national 
governments were unable or unwilling to prosecute, ranging from 
genocide to theft. The international system would have intervened, 
regardless of the nature of the crime, whenever domestic courts failed 
to act. International criminal procedures would have predicated 
international action on domestic inaction. They would have been 
broad, flexible, and efficient enough to handle many, varied crimes, 
especially those in failed or failing states.16 
A third possible function of international criminal law is to 
prosecute the most serious or grave atrocities, whether or not they 
have transjurisdictional elements. This atrocity function seems 
improbable precisely because national governments often want to 
prosecute atrocities themselves and would rarely cede jurisdiction 
over these gravest crimes to international tribunals.17 
Yet international criminal justice has largely focused on 
atrocities, perhaps as a legacy of the Nuremberg Tribunal, which 
responded to the Holocaust. Nuremberg’s express purpose, according 
to the London Charter that established it, was “the just and prompt 
trial and punishment of the major war criminals of the European 
Axis.”18 It received jurisdiction over only the gravest crimes: war 
crimes, crimes against the peace, and crimes against humanity.19 The 
U.S. and United Kingdom (U.K.) decided to export their liberal and 
legalist notions of justice, in stark contrast to the Nazi and Soviet 
approaches to justice.20 This legalist element was reflected in 
Nuremberg’s procedure, including full rights to counsel, extensive 
 
 15. See Stephen D. Krasner & Carlos Pascual, Addressing State Failure, FOREIGN AFF., 
July/Aug. 2005, at 153. 
 16. Hybrid tribunals established as joint ventures between domestic and international 
authorities in weak states reflect this supplementary function. See, e.g., Statute of the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone arts. 4–5, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 145 (recognizing jurisdiction over 
international crimes, as well as over arson and abduction of girls in violation of Sierra Leonean 
law); Stephen D. Krasner, The Hole in the Whole: Sovereignty, Shared Sovereignty, and 
International Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1075, 1095–96 (2004) (discussing the use of international 
judges in courts in Hong Kong, East Timor, Kosovo, and Sierra Leone). 
 17. See Kenneth W. Abbott, International Relations Theory, International Law, and the 
Regime Governing Atrocities in Internal Conflicts, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 361, 375 (1999) (discussing 
sovereignty costs in criminal prosecution). 
 18. Charter of the International Military Tribunal Annexed to the London Agreement for 
the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis art. 1, Aug. 
8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1546, 82 U.N.T.S. 280. 
 19. Id. art. 6. 
 20. BASS, supra note 11, at 147–206. 
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opportunities for cross-examination by the defense, and frequent 
decisions by the tribunal protecting defense rights.21 Though perhaps 
inadequate from today’s perspective, the Nuremberg procedure was 
designed to provide a free and fair trial, despite the costs and 
logistical challenges.22 
Later courts continued this primary function of holding 
wrongdoers accountable for atrocities. The ICTY was established 
“for the sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for serious 
violations of international humanitarian law.”23 Similarly, the 
preamble of the Rome Statute (establishing the ICC) provides: 
“[T]he most serious crimes of concern to the international community 
as a whole must not go unpunished . . . .”24 
True, certain provisions of the Rome Statute suggest the 
backstop function noted above—holding wrongdoers accountable 
when national governments cannot or will not act. Article 17 of the 
Rome Statute bars cases from the ICC while national governments 
undertake their own genuine investigations and prosecutions.25 But 
the ICC is already jurisdictionally limited to adjudicating the most 
severe crimes.26 In other words, the ICC is a backstop to national 
governments only within the narrow category of atrocities. 
The focus on atrocities has largely driven the development of 
both international jurisdiction and procedure. The tribunals for 
Rwanda and Yugoslavia and the ICC have each only been given very 
narrow subject-matter jurisdictions, largely over war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, and genocide.27 Each of these tribunals has also 
 
 21. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal Annexed to the London Agreement 
for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, supra 
note 18, art. 16(d) (conferring the right to defense counsel); id. art. 16(e) (conferring the right to 
cross-examination); 9 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL 
MILITARY TRIBUNAL 665 (1947) (ruling in favor of defense rights to evidence). 
 22. See 2 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL 
MILITARY TRIBUNAL 98–102 (1947) (opening statement of Justice Robert Jackson, Nuremberg 
Tribunal, Nov. 21, 1945, acknowledging that the court’s procedures and the prosecution’s 
research were adequate but not “finished craftsmanship,” because of the need for swift justice 
within months of victory). 
 23. S.C. Res. 827, supra note 3, ¶ 2. 
 24. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 5, pmbl. 
 25. Id. art. 17. 
 26. Id. arts. 6–8. 
 27. See S.C. Res. 955, supra note 3, arts. 2–5 (defining the crimes within the ICTR’s 
jurisdiction); S.C. Res. 827, supra note 3, arts. 2–5 (defining the crimes within the ICTY’s 
jurisdiction); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 5, art. 5 (giving the 
ICC jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide). 
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developed procedures that focus on scrupulous procedural regularity 
and eliciting truth at the expense of speed and efficiency.28 For 
example, in its early years the ICTY relied almost exclusively on live 
rather than affidavit testimony, to ensure full cross-examination of 
witnesses.29 Even today, the ICC refuses to admit evidence provided 
by third parties, such as the UN, when the prosecutor cannot fully 
share that evidence with the defense.30 
Although elaborate procedures worked for twenty-two 
defendants at Nuremberg and for the earliest Rwandans and 
Yugoslavians,31 that model has grown problematic as the range of 
cases has mushroomed. These tribunals remain limited to atrocities, 
yet today there are probably thousands of war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, and genocides each year.32 Moreover, as more than one 
hundred nations have signed on to the ICC, the geographic reach and 
number of potential cases has exploded. Thus, the procedural model 
that sufficed for a few dozen Nazis is no longer viable. 
This atrocity function of international criminal justice stands in 
stark contrast to the functions of American criminal justice. Domestic 
systems must prosecute exponentially more defendants and cases 
 
 28. For a discussion of the ICTY’s evidentiary standards, see Patricia M. Wald, To 
“Establish Incredible Events by Credible Evidence”: The Use of Affidavit Testimony in 
Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal Proceedings, 42 HARV. INT’L L.J. 535, 537 (2001). Over time, 
tribunals have developed their rules in an effort to process cases more quickly and handle 
evidence more efficiently, but the results of these developments have been mixed. See Langer, 
supra note 8, at 885–905. For example, the ICTY revised its rules of procedure to expedite trials 
through pretrial hearings and affidavit testimony. See ICTY R. P. & EVID. 65bis(A) (providing 
for pretrial conferences); id. 71(A) (allowing greater use of affidavit testimony by deleting the 
1995 rules requirement that such testimony only be used in “exceptional circumstances”). 
 29. See ICTY R. P. & EVID. 71(a) (1995) (amended 1998) (allowing for affidavit testimony 
only in “exceptional circumstances”). 
 30. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1486, Judgment on 
the Appeal of the Prosecutor Against the Decision of the Trial Chamber I Entitled “Decision 
on the Consequences of Non-Disclosure of Exculpatory Materials Covered by Article 54(3)(e) 
Agreements and the Application to Stay the Prosecution of the Accused Together with Certain 
Other Issues Raised at the Status Conference on 10 June 2008,” ¶ 97 (Oct. 21, 2008), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc578371.pdf (overturning the trial chamber’s order to 
release Lubanga Dyilo but maintaining the inadmissibility of nondisclosable evidence). 
 31. See Richard Goldstone, Assessing the Work of the United Nations War Crimes 
Tribunals, 33 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 4–8 (1997) (discussing the early work of the ICTY). 
 32. By February 1, 2006, the ICC Office of the Prosecutor had received 1,732 
communications with regard to alleged international crimes possibly within the court’s 
jurisdiction. See OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, ICC, UPDATE ON COMMUNICATIONS RECEIVED 
BY THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR OF THE ICC (2006), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/F596D08D-D810-43A2-99BB-B899B9C5BCD2/277421/OTP_Update_on_ 
Communications_10_February_2006.pdf. 
BIBAS & BURKE-WHITE IN FINAL 12/15/2009 11:42:20 AM 
2010] INTERNATIONAL IDEALISM 649 
across a far wider range of crimes. Unlike international criminal 
tribunals, which can leave lesser crimes to national courts, domestic 
courts must address the full range of crimes. To handle these 
caseloads, American criminal procedures have emphasized efficiency 
and case management, sometimes at the expense of perfect accuracy 
and scrupulous procedures.33 Thus, American law and practice can 
guide international law as its range and caseloads expand. 
Moreover, America’s federal system of dual sovereignty, like its 
international counterpart, must allocate cases across multiple levels. 
To oversimplify, the Commerce Clause was once understood as 
limiting federal jurisdiction to cases that spanned state borders, 
reaching interstate but not intrastate crimes.34 (A few other 
constitutional provisions allowed the federal government to punish 
violations of certain exclusively federal concerns, such as federal tax 
evasion and counterfeiting.) That interstate function of federal 
criminal law resembled international criminal law’s original focus on 
transnational crimes such as piracy. More recently, federal civil rights 
prosecutions under the Fourteenth Amendment35 have circumvented 
and substituted for racist and corrupt state government.36 In other 
words, federal law served as a backstop. 
This backstop function, however, has always been only a small 
slice of American federal jurisdiction. As the interstate/intrastate 
divide crumbled after the New Deal, federal criminal jurisdiction has 
become a hybrid of two functions: targeting the most serious crimes 
 
 33. The best example of this efficiency mindset at the expense of procedural regularity is 
the hypertrophy of American plea bargaining. See generally FISHER, supra note 12, at 40–47 
(discussing how heavy caseloads encouraged prosecutors to plea bargain); MILTON HEUMANN, 
PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, JUDGES, AND DEFENSE 
ATTORNEYS 24–32 (2d ed. 1978) (discussing how the perceived need to dispose of cases quickly 
pushes prosecutors, district attorneys, and judges to plea bargain even in the absence of heavy 
caseloads). 
 34. See Champion v. Ames (The Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321, 363 (1903) (finding federal 
criminal jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause over transporting lottery tickets across state 
lines). For a historical discussion, see generally Adam H. Kurland, First Principles of American 
Federalism and the Nature of Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 45 EMORY L.J. 1 (1996). 
 35. See, e.g., United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 760 (1966) (enforcing a statute 
criminalizing conspiracies to violate rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 36. See, e.g., Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 91 (1996) (reviewing federal convictions 
and sentences arising out of the federal prosecution of Los Angeles police officers for beating 
motorist Rodney King); see also Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief: The Federalization of 
American Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 1140 (1995) (noting that the Civil Rights Acts 
“conferred federal jurisdiction over state crimes where the affected citizens were denied their 
rights or where state courts would not enforce them”). 
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and those than span borders.37 Through a range of jurisdictional 
hooks, today the federal government targets many of the gravest 
crimes and leaves lesser crimes to state prosecutors.38 The 
accommodation between federal and state levels has been pragmatic, 
driven by resource allocation and interest rather than theoretical 
categories of interstate versus intrastate matters. To handle the broad 
range of cases and allocate it across state and federal systems, 
domestic criminal procedure has had to learn to manage cases and 
engage in gatekeeping effectively.39 
Though their functions differ somewhat, structurally and 
procedurally, the international and domestic systems share much in 
common. Ultimately, both seek to hold wrongdoers accountable 
effectively and efficiently through legal processes. Both seek to 
allocate cases between two tiers along somewhat similar functional 
divides. Thus, it is particularly surprising that the two systems barely 
engage each other and that scholars within each system rarely look to 
their counterparts. 
B. The Purposes of Criminal Law 
Domestic and international criminal justice also serve somewhat 
different purposes. Domestic criminal law serves four main, broad 
 
 37. Federal criminal jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause is extremely broad though 
not infinitely elastic. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551–63 (1995). 
 38. Although states conduct most capital murder prosecutions, federal prosecutors have 
taken over substantial shares of bank robberies, large drug-trafficking, organized crime, and 
white-collar crime. See JODI M. BROWN & PATRICK A. LANGAN, FELONY SENTENCES IN THE 
UNITED STATES, 1996, at 3, 7 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, Bulletin No. NCJ 175045, 1999), 
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fsus96.pdf (noting that most bank robberies 
are prosecuted federally, and that federal drug sentences are substantially longer on average 
than state sentences); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK 
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, at tbl.5.17.2004, tbl.5.44.2004 (2009), http://www.albany.edu/ 
sourcebook/tost_5.html (indicating that in 2004, federal prosecutors handled roughly 13 percent 
of drug trafficking prosecutions—201,760 felony convictions in state courts compared to 25,539 
in federal courts—and 19 percent of fraud prosecutions—48,560 felony convictions in state 
courts compared to 9,261 in federal courts); see also Michael Edmund O’Neill, Understanding 
Federal Prosecutorial Declinations: An Empirical Analysis of Predictive Factors, 41 AM. CRIM. 
L. REV. 1439, 1456 (2004) (reporting the results of an empirical study indicating that federal 
prosecutors are more likely to take cases involving large quantities of drugs and leave those 
involving smaller quantities to the states). 
 39. See Daniel C. Richman, The Changing Boundaries Between Federal and Local Law 
Enforcement, 2 CRIM. JUST. 81, 91–96 (2000) (describing the accommodation of federal and 
state law enforcement as one of “negotiated boundaries,” in which substantive laws overlap but 
resource constraints, policy priorities, local culture, and sources of information influence which 
cases are dealt with federally and which are left to states). 
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purposes: retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.40 
In recent decades, rehabilitation has fallen out of favor because of 
doubts about its efficacy.41 Some scholars now promote expressive 
condemnation, the need to denounce the wrong and reinforce 
society’s norms.42 Notwithstanding vigorous disagreement, many 
scholars and most laymen emphasize retribution as the primary 
purpose of domestic criminal punishment and incapacitation as a 
secondary goal.43 This approach stresses moral justice, but leaves 
room for practical concerns as well. 
If international law sought to serve as a backstop, a supplement 
for deficient domestic criminal justice, its purposes would mirror 
those of domestic criminal justice. Transnational crimes, such as 
software piracy and smuggling, are often less morally freighted than 
domestic crimes, so they might call for less emphasis on retribution 
and more on deterrence. But, as we have explained, international 
criminal law has largely neglected the transnational and backstop 
functions. 
Though domestic criminal law redresses a breathtakingly broad 
array of crimes, from the gravest to the most trivial, international law 
targets a few high-level, highly public, politically salient mass 
 
 40. Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment: A Retrospective 
on the Past Century and Some Thoughts About the Next, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 1 (2003). 
 41. FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: PENAL POLICY 
AND SOCIAL PURPOSE 7, 57 (1981); Alschuler, supra note 40, at 9; Robert Martinson, What 
Works? Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, PUB. INT., Spring 1974, at 22, 25 (“With 
few and isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative efforts that have been reported so far have had 
no appreciable effect on recidivism.”). 
 42. E.g., Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 
594–601 (1996) (supporting expressive condemnation). 
 43. E.g., MICHAEL S. MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL 
LAW 83 n.1 (1997) (collecting scholarship embodying retributivism’s resurgence); Alschuler, 
supra note 40, at 15; Kevin M. Carlsmith et al., Why Do We Punish? Deterrence and Just Deserts 
as Motives for Punishment, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 284, 295–97 (2002) (finding, in 
two empirical studies, that laymen’s punishment judgments were driven by just deserts and not 
by deterrence considerations); John M. Darley et al., Incapacitation and Just Deserts as Motives 
for Punishment, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 659, 676 (2000) (finding, in two empirical studies, that 
laymen’s punishment judgments were driven primarily by the seriousness of the offense rather 
than the likelihood of recidivism, suggesting a dominant objective of retribution, not 
incapacitation); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 
453, 477–78, 492–94 (1997); cf. Paul J. Hofer & Mark H. Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the 
Rules: Finding and Using the Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 40 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 19, 24 (2003) (identifying retribution as the dominant purpose and incapacitation as the 
secondary purpose of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines). 
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atrocities, which often arise out of political instability.44 Thus, 
international criminal law is expected to serve not only the four 
purposes of domestic criminal law45 but also a fifth one: restorative 
justice.46 Because international criminal cases are high profile and 
occur during or after conflicts, international criminal law is often 
called upon to reconcile broken communities.47 With the advent of the 
ICC, the demands on international tribunals have increased. Both 
states and nongovernmental organizations have called on the ICC to 
fulfill all of the functions of domestic law, in addition to promoting 
international peace and security through restorative justice.48 
International criminal justice should focus its aims. Resources 
are limited, so the international system cannot create meaningful 
amounts of incapacitation or deterrence.49 Because it is so hard to 
dispense much retail justice in the wake of a war or genocide, 
international criminal law should focus on providing public 
restoration, reconciliation, and retribution for the worst of the worst. 
In other words, international criminal justice, which can use a few 
cases to send messages, is better than domestic criminal justice at the 
more symbolic functions of punishing, vindicating victims, teaching, 
healing, and reconciling. International tribunals are ideally situated to 
restore and reconcile because their cases are high profile and their 
 
 44. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT 58–140 (2007) (discussing the temporal, territorial, and subject-matter 
limitations of the ICC compared with other courts). 
 45. See Michael P. Scharf, The Tools for Enforcing International Criminal Justice in the 
New Millennium: Lessons from the Yugoslavia Tribunal, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 925, 928–35 (2000) 
(discussing the purposes and expectations of the ICTY). 
 46. While not entirely absent from American law, “[t]o date, restorative justice in the 
United States has operated at the fringes of the criminal justice system with small programs, 
often run by churches and private agencies, handling a relatively small number of juvenile cases 
and cases involving minor offenses.” Sara Sun Beale, Still Tough on Crime? Prospects for 
Restorative Justice in the United States, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 413, 413. 
 47. For discussions of international restorative justice, see DESMOND TUTU, NO FUTURE 
WITHOUT FORGIVENESS passim (2000); Elizabeth Kiss, Moral Ambition Within and Beyond 
Political Constraints: Reflections on Restorative Justice, in TRUTH V. JUSTICE 68, 79–83 (Robert 
I. Rotberg & Dennis Thompson eds., 2000). 
 48. For a list of statements by national officials detailing their expectations for the ICC, see 
Burke-White, supra note 9, at 59–61. 
 49. While some have advocated international criminal justice as a deterrent, it is difficult to 
document deterrence in the international context. See Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can 
International Criminal Justice Prevent Future Atrocities?, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 7, 31 (2001) (“No 
one should entertain the illusion that the relative success of the ICTY, the ICTR, and the ICC 
process, or the engagement of national and foreign courts, has somehow exorcised the specter of 
genocide and other massive crimes from our midst.”). 
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stage is global, rising above national politics and local ethnic tensions. 
As Mark Osiel argues, atrocity trials should serve primarily as 
pedagogical spectacles, telling stories and shaping national identity 
and collective memory.50 Of course, trials cannot create 
comprehensive historical records; historians, truth commissions, and 
commissions of inquiry are far better at that.51 But trials can 
nevertheless publicly acknowledge atrocities and begin to restore 
their wounds. They cannot prosecute every perpetrator nor make one 
a scapegoat for many others. But even a handful of prosecutions, with 
due process for defendants as well as sensitivity to victims, can make 
these points. Nuremberg and South Africa are two well-known, albeit 
very different, examples of how public tribunals can document 
atrocities and clear the public record.52 International trials can also 
present evidence in ways that publicly document atrocities, by for 
example showing the “Scorpions” video in the Milošević trial, which 
recorded the gruesome executions of six youths in Srebrenica.53 
Public retribution against political and military leaders is another 
important purpose, because atrocities excite the public’s outrage and 
demand for justice. Prosecutions denounce and condemn crimes, 
underscoring their wrongness.54 Incapacitation should be central only 
during ongoing conflicts when national courts are truly unable to act, 
and even then only for the highest-level offenders. 
 
 50. MARK OSIEL, MASS ATROCITY, COLLECTIVE MEMORY, AND THE LAW 2–3, 39 (1997). 
 51. For an extended caution about the inability of international trials to document 
atrocities comprehensively or to restore victims, see Mirjan Damaška, What Is the Point of 
International Criminal Justice?, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 329, 332–43 (2008). 
 52. See, e.g., NORBERT EHRENFREUND, THE NUREMBERG LEGACY: HOW THE NAZI WAR 
CRIMES TRIALS CHANGED THE COURSE OF HISTORY 139–48 (2007) (describing the effects of 
Nuremberg’s documentation of Nazi crimes); PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: 
CONFRONTING STATE TERROR AND ATROCITY 24–32, 152–65 (2002) (describing the 
reconciliatory effects of the South African Truth Commission); see also 2 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR 
WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, supra note 22, at 98–
102 (opening statement of Justice Robert Jackson acknowledging that, although the individual 
Nazi defendants needed no further incapacitation because “their personal capacity for evil is 
forever past,” their evil deeds required retribution and deterrence, because “any tenderness to 
them is a victory and an encouragement to all the evils which are attached to their names. 
Civilization can afford no compromise with the social forces which would gain renewed strength 
if we deal ambiguously or indecisively with the men in whom those forces now precariously 
survive”). 
 53. Frank Petit, ICTY: The Domino Effect of a Video, INT’L JUST. TRIB., June 13, 2005, 
http://www.rnw.nl/int-justice/article/icty-domino-effect-video. 
 54. See Damaška, supra note 51, at 343–47 (advocating making “the didactic function” the 
primary goal of international criminal justice). 
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The differences in purposes between the two systems do not 
undermine the lessons of our comparative exercise. On the contrary, 
the comparison provides insights into how international criminal law 
can better achieve other goals, such as retribution, which the domestic 
system serves reasonably well. It also highlights what international 
criminal justice can learn by contrasting its strengths and weaknesses 
with those of domestic criminal procedure. Larger, speedier domestic 
systems are much better at deterring and incapacitating. International 
criminal justice should acknowledge that its capacity is necessarily 
much more limited. It cannot hope to match domestic deterrence and 
incapacitation, but should instead emphasize punishing as well as 
healing the wounds of atrocities. 
C. An Overview of the Two Systems 
1. International Criminal Justice.  Scholars often describe the 
courts that enforce international law as uncoordinated and perhaps 
even ineffective.55 Over the last decade, however, new courts have 
emerged rapidly and now enforce international law far more 
systematically. Though it remains dysfunctional, international 
criminal justice today is a nascent system guided by core principles. 
In recent years, many more international, domestic, and hybrid 
courts have begun to enforce international criminal law. At the 
international level are courts established by international treaties or 
by the UN Security Council: the ICC, the ICTY, the ICTR, and the 
UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL).56 The ICC has jurisdiction 
over international crimes committed on the territory of or by 
nationals of the 110 States Parties to the Rome Statute as well as 
crimes referred by the Security Council.57 In contrast, the ICTY, 
 
 55. E.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 214 (2d ed. 1994) (suggesting that 
international law is not properly law); Martinez, supra note 8, at 443 (noting that based on 
common definitions of a system, “there is not now an international judicial system nor could one 
exist in the absence of a central scheme of hierarchical relationships”). 
 56. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 5; S.C. Res. 827, 
supra note 3; S.C. Res. 955, supra note 3; Statute of the U.N. Special Tribunal for Lebanon, S.C. 
Res. 1757, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1757 (May 30, 2007). While the STL was created by the UN 
Security Council acting under Chapter VII, elements of its structure and operation are more 
similar to hybrid tribunals such as those discussed below. 
 57. For a list of the 110 States Parties, see The States Parties to the Rome Statute, 
http://www2.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+parties/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2009). The ICC 
investigation of the situation in Sudan was referred by the UN Security Council through 
Resolution 1593 (2005) pursuant to Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute. Press Release, U.N. Sec. 
Council, Security Council Refers Situation in Darfur, Sudan, to Prosecutor of International 
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ICTR, and STL have limited jurisdiction, restricted to crimes in the 
former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Lebanon, respectively. Collectively, 
these international tribunals reach very broadly, covering more than 
half the world’s countries and about a third of its population.58 All 
four courts are limited to the most serious crimes, namely war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, genocide, and (for the STL) the 
assassination of Rafik Hariri.59 
In addition, many national courts routinely prosecute and 
adjudicate international crimes.60 Finally, hybrid tribunals sit halfway 
between the domestic and international levels and rest on 
cooperation between national and international institutions.61 Hybrid 
courts were or are operating in Bosnia and Herzegovina, East Timor, 
Cambodia, and Sierra Leone.62 These courts draw authority from both 
 
Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. SC/8351 (Mar. 31, 2005), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/ 
docs/2005/sc8351.doc.htm. 
 58. Roughly 1.9 billion people live in countries that are States Parties to the ICC. See CIA, 
THE WORLD FACTBOOK passim (2009). 
 59. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 5, art. 5; S.C. Res. 827, 
supra note 3, arts. 1–5; S.C. Res. 955, supra note 3, arts. 2–6; Statute of the U.N. Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon, supra note 56, art. 1. 
 60. Some domestic criminal justice systems, such as those in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo or Chile, prosecute recent or past crimes based on territorial or nationality jurisdiction. 
See, e.g., U.N. MISSION IN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (MONUC), MONTHLY HUMAN 
RIGHTS ASSESSMENT: JULY 2007 (2007), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/category, 
COI,MONUC,,,46ee75401a,0.html. Others, such as those of Israel, Belgium, France, Germany, 
and Spain, prosecute extraterritorial crimes based on universal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Att’y Gen. 
v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 18 (Jer. D.C. 1961), aff’d 36 I.L.R. 277 (S. Ct. 1962) (Isr.); Hijazi v. 
Sharon, Cour d’Appel [CA] [intermediate court of appeals] Brussels, June 26, 2002 (Belg.); 
Cour de Cassation [Cass. crim.] [highest court of ordinary jurisdiction], Jan. 6, 1998, Bull. crim., 
No. 2, translated in 1 YB. INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 598 (1998), nullifying and dismissing 
Tribunal de Grande Instance de Privas (examining magistrate), Jan. 9, 1996 and Cour d’Appel 
de Nimmes, Mar. 20, 1996 (Fr.); Bayerisches Oberstes Landesgericht [BayObLGZ] [court of 
appeals for selected matters in Bavaria], 23 May 1997 - 3 St 20/96 (F.R.G.) reprinted in part in 
NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 392 (1998) (Ger.); R v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary 
Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3), [2000] 1 A.C. 147 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Q.B.) 
(U.K. House of Lords proceeding on the extradition of Pinochet to face universal jurisdiction 
charges in Spain). 
 61. See Burke-White, supra note 4, at 75–97. 
 62. Law on Amendments to the Law on Court of Bosnia & Herzegovina, OFFICIAL 
GAZETTE BIH, 24/02 (Aug. 29, 2002) (Bos.); Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the 
Period of Democratic Kampuchea, 2004, NS/RKM/1004/006 (Cambodia); Statute of the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone, supra note 16; G.A. Res 57/228, ¶¶ 1–4, U.N. Doc. A/Res/57/228B (May 
22, 2003); Burke-White, supra note 4, at 41–54 (describing hybrid courts operating in East 
Timor); William W. Burke-White, The Domestic Influence of International Criminal Tribunals: 
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the Creation of the State 
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national legislation and a UN mandate.63 They use both national and 
foreign officials and apply a combination of domestic and 
international law. They fill an impunity gap, serving as backstops 
when international tribunals lack jurisdiction or are overwhelmed by 
atrocities but national courts cannot or will not fill the need. 
Each of these courts is independent, yet they have far more in 
common than commentators recognize. First, international, domestic, 
and hybrid criminal courts apply a common body of international law 
defining three international crimes: war crimes, genocide, and crimes 
against humanity.64 Second, international criminal courts have 
developed detailed procedural rules,65 some of which have migrated 
into the practice of hybrid tribunals as well.66 Third, culpability is 
emerging as a gatekeeping criterion for selecting cases.67 
 
Court of Bosnia & Herzegovina, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 279, 285–89 (2008) (discussing 
the creation and operation of the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina). 
 63. See Dickinson, supra note 7, at 295 (discussing the features of hybrid courts). 
 64. While definitions of war crimes and crimes against humanity have developed over time, 
the Rome Statute fixes core definitions of these crimes. See generally GIDEON BOAS, JAMES L. 
BISCHOFF & NATALIE REID, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW PRACTITIONER LIBRARY: 
VOLUME 2: ELEMENTS OF CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (2008) (specifying the 
elements of core crimes). 
 65. The ICTY developed rules of procedure and evidence for modern international 
criminal tribunals. See ICTY R. P. & EVID.; Joseph L. Falvey, Jr., United Nations Justice or 
Military Justice: Which Is the Oxymoron? An Analysis of the Rules and Procedure and Evidence 
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 19 FORDHAM J. INT’L L.J. 475, 
485–528 (1995) (discussing the development of the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence). 
While the rules have been amended, they remain fairly stable. Compare ICTY R. P. & EVID. 
(1995) (amended 1996), with ICTY R. P. & EVID. (2009). The ICC Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence contain important innovations and reflect the state of the art. See generally ICC R. P. 
& EVID.; Fabricio Guariglia, The Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the International 
Criminal Court: A New Development in International Adjudication of Individual Criminal 
Responsibility, in 2 THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A 
COMMENTARY 1111 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002). 
 66. ICTY officials gave guidance to the new State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
resulting in procedures that reflect international practice more than traditional Bosnian 
procedure and transformed Bosnia into a quasi-common-law system. See INDEP. JUDICIAL 
COMM’N, HIGH JUDICIAL AND PROSECUTORIAL COUNCIL OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, 
FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT JUDICIAL COMMISSION JULY 2001–31 MARCH 2004, at 
161–62 (2004) (“Some elements of the inquisitorial process were abandoned in favour of a more 
adversarial process.”). 
 67. Compare, for example, Slobodan Milošević, a president who ordered and orchestrated 
genocide, with Predrag Banović, a prison camp guard who beat detainees. See Prosecutor v. 
Banović, Case No. IT-02-65, Consolidated Indictment, ¶¶ 31, 32, 34 (July 5, 2002) (charging 
Banović, along with other guards at the Keraterm and Omarska prison camps, with crimes 
against humanity). In its early days, the ICTY prosecuted any perpetrator over whom it could 
secure custody, regardless of culpability. See Expert Group to Conduct a Review of the 
Effective Operation and Functioning of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
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Fourth, courts increasingly rely on the principle of subsidiarity to 
allocate cases. Subsidiarity suggests hearing cases at the lowest level 
of authority that can deal with them effectively—in the territorial 
state when possible.68 Subsidiarity efficiently conserves international 
resources and situates cases close to the events, evidence, and victims, 
which aids restorative justice and reconciliation. The ICC implements 
the principle of subsidiarity through the rule of complementarity, 
which means that it hears cases only when national courts cannot or 
will not act.69 The ICTY and ICTR accomplish the same goal by 
referring cases back to national authorities when domestic courts 
become able and willing to prosecute.70 In other words, international 
courts serve as backstops.71 Even some national courts rely on the 
principle of subsidiarity in deciding whether to exercise universal 
jurisdiction.72 Collectively, these developments have grown into a 
system for enforcing international criminal law. 
 
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Report of the Expert Group to Conduct a 
Review of the Effective Operation and Functioning of the International Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, ¶ 92, UN Doc. A/54/634 (1999) 
(describing the ICTY’s difficulty in obtaining custody over leadership figures and prosecuting 
any low-level indictees in custody). Political pressures to reduce the ICTY’s caseload led to the 
use of culpability as a case selection device. See Judge Claude Jorda, President, ICTY, Address 
to the United Nations Security Council (July 23, 2002), available at http://www.icty.org/sid/8080 
(suggesting that the tribunal only prosecute “the highest-ranking political, military, paramilitary 
and civilian leaders”). The ICC also relies on culpability. See Office of the Prosecutor, ICC, 
Criteria for Selection of Situations and Cases 5 (June 2006) (unpublished draft policy paper, on 
file with authors) (looking to the scale, nature, and impact of crimes). 
 68. See Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1, 31 I.L.M. 253, 
amended by Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties 
Establishing the European Communities and Related Acts, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1, 
37 I.L.M. 56 and Treaty of Nice Amending the Treaty on European Union, The Treaties 
Establishing the European Communities and Related Acts, Mar. 10, 2001, 2001 O.J. (C 80) 1 
(implementing subsidiarity). 
 69. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 5, art. 17. 
 70. ICTY R. P. & EVID. 11bis (providing for the referral of cases back to national 
authorities); ICTR R. P. & EVID. 11bis (same); Prosecutor v. Stanković, Case No. IT-96-23/2-
PT, Decision on Rule 11bis Referral, ¶ 42 (Sept. 1, 2005) (setting guidelines for referring cases). 
 71. See Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, The Future of International Law Is 
Domestic, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 327, 339 (2006) (discussing the backstop function of international 
law). 
 72. The influential Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction consider the “connection 
between the requesting state and the alleged perpetrator, the crime, or the victim” and “the 
place of commission of the crime.” PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 28 
(2001), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/princeton.html. Some national courts 
implement subsidiary jurisdiction by prosecuting only when the territorial state does not. 
Landesgericht Salzburg 38 Vr 1335/94, Hv 42/94 (May 31, 1995), enforcing /Re/ Dusko C., 
Oberster Gerichtshof, No. 15 Os 99/94 (July 13, 1994). 
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2. Domestic Criminal Procedure.  In contrast, domestic criminal 
procedure in the United States is more efficient but has its own 
pathologies. The coherence and professionalism that make it efficient 
at handling large volumes of cases also make it opaque, insular, and 
more amoral. As a result, domestic criminal procedure is better at 
incapacitating cheaply but less successful at teaching lessons, 
restoring communities and victims, and earning public confidence. 
In its infancy, American criminal justice centered around public 
morality plays (namely jury trials), much as the young system of 
international criminal justice now does. Today, however, the domestic 
system runs on a well-oiled plea-bargaining assembly line. 
Professional (usually local) police investigate and arrest, often 
interrogating and conducting searches in the process. After that, 
professional prosecutors handle cases from charging through 
conviction and sentencing. Prosecutors negotiate with defense 
lawyers and make key decisions about whether and what crimes to 
charge, what plea bargains to strike, and what sentences to specify in 
their plea bargains.73 
Many features of this assembly-line criminal justice are worthy of 
note. First, the system is designed to handle large volumes of cases. 
Like international trials, jury trials are time-consuming and 
expensive, and resources are limited, so plea bargains emerged as a 
cheaper, more efficient way to maximize convictions at minimum 
cost.74 Today, guilty pleas resolve 95 percent of adjudicated cases, and 
most of these result from plea bargains. Both sides’ lawyers are 
professionals, repeat players who know the going rates for particular 
crimes. They strike bargains that lower individual sentences in 
exchange for increasing the total volume of cases processed. They 
often strike cooperation deals, lowering defendant A’s sentence in 
exchange for his undercover help or testimony against defendant B. 
This approach maximizes incapacitation and perhaps deterrence. The 
downside is that the assembly line trades off some of the softer, moral 
values that citizens expect from criminal justice. These include giving 
citizens their day in court, letting the public sit in judgment as jurors, 
 
 73. STEPHANOS BIBAS, ASSEMBLY-LINE CRIMINAL JUSTICE chs. 1–2 (forthcoming 2011). 
 74. The best historical account of plea bargaining emphasizes that it emerged as a tool to 
lighten prosecutors’ and judges’ workloads and avoid time-consuming and unpredictable jury 
trials. See FISHER, supra note 12, at 12–44, 111–24. 
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vindicating victims, denouncing wrongs, and restoring wounded 
relationships among victims, wrongdoers, and communities.75 
Second, professionals often see it as their job to husband and 
allocate their scarce time and money. Because there are far more 
crimes and eligible cases than prosecutors can handle, police and 
prosecutors gatekeep. They apply formal or informal criteria, 
targeting the most urgent kinds of cases and getting rid of smaller 
cases involving first-time or sympathetic defendants. They routinely 
screen out cases based on weak evidence, minimal culpability, or lack 
of seriousness.76 They may, for example, routinely dismiss thefts of 
less than $100 or possession of less than an ounce of marijuana unless 
the defendant is a recidivist.77 Prosecutors often divert minor cases for 
drug treatment and dismiss them upon successful completion of a 
program. They sometimes decline to prosecute lesser cases when 
defendants make restitution or civil remedies are available.78 Federal 
agents and prosecutors may decline cases that are less serious or more 
effectively handled at the state level. Conversely, federal officials are 
especially likely to pursue cases in which state criminal justice is 
ineffective or suspect, such as cases of public corruption or civil rights 
violations by local officials.79 These effective screening and allocation 
measures are analogous to the international principles of subsidiarity 
and complementarity. 
Third, the system is hidden from public view and insulated from 
public control. Police do not announce whom they will stop and what 
crimes they will target, lest they encourage more crimes within their 
blind spots. Prosecutors do not explain their decisions to charge, 
decline, or plea bargain, lest they undercut deterrence or create 
grounds for appeal. Discovery, grand jury proceedings, plea bargains, 
and hearings are hidden or obscure.80 Grand juries are rubber stamps 
and petit juries are rare; instead, prosecutors and defense lawyers run 
 
 75. See BIBAS, supra note 73, chs. 1, 3; Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-
Criminal-Law Values and Criminal Procedure: The Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 
88 CORNELL L. REV. 1361, 1400–04, 1406–07 (2003) [hereinafter Bibas, Harmonizing]; 
Stephanos Bibas, Essay, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 911, 947–48 (2006) [hereinafter Bibas, Transparency]. 
 76. See Bibas, supra note 12, at 2470. 
 77. Cf. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ WRITTEN GUIDELINES FOR 
THE DECLINATION OF ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS: A REPORT TO 
THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 11 tbl.3, 22 tbl.11 (1979). 
 78. See Bibas, Transparency, supra note 75, at 933 & n.91. 
 79. See infra note 191 and accompanying text. 
 80. Bibas, Transparency, supra note 75, at 923–24. 
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the show. Judges rubber-stamp plea deals struck in secret; public 
court hearings are empty ceremonies with preordained results.81 
Because domestic criminal justice is far from transparent, it is not 
accountable. District attorneys, for example, are elected. But their 
elections are not informed referenda on prosecutorial policies, most 
of which are secret or hidden from view. Electoral races are distorted 
by huge incumbency advantages and driven by occasional scandals 
and unrepresentative, high-profile celebrity trials.82 Lack of 
transparency thus hobbles accountability. 
Domestic criminal justice, then, has succeeded perhaps too well 
in processing cases efficiently, at the expense of some of criminal 
justice’s other aims. International criminal justice can learn both from 
its successes and its shortcomings. 
II.  THE MENTALITY OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE PRACTITIONERS 
One of the more troubling aspects of international criminal law is 
the mentality that many practitioners share. This Part begins by 
exploring their precommitments and contrasting them with the 
greater range of views in domestic systems. After that, we consider 
the career paths of international criminal justice practitioners, again 
contrasting them with domestic career trajectories. 
A.  Ideologies and Worldview 
Culture and people define organizations as much as laws do. 
That is true of international prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges, 
who strive to subordinate power and politics to the rule of law. In his 
opening statement at Nuremberg, Justice Jackson described his 
mandate as defending civilization itself, taming despotic power 
through the law.83 The emphasis has been on victorious outcomes and 
only secondarily on just processes. When civilization itself is at stake, 
conviction takes precedence over adjudication. Many later officials, 
including the ICC’s presiding judge and chief prosecutor, still echo 
 
 81. Id. at 929–30. 
 82. Id. at 935; see also Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial 
Accountability, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 983–91 (2009); Ronald F. Wright, How Prosecutor 
Elections Fail Us, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 581, 591–602 (2009). 
 83. 2 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY 
TRIBUNAL, supra note 22, at 102–04. 
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Jackson’s emphasis on taming raw power rather than observing legal 
niceties.84 
This ideology of international justice is even more apparent 
among some rank-and-file staff. Junior staffers are often recent law 
school graduates who have chosen a career in international criminal 
law out of a devotion to this mission. In the words of one such ICTY 
judicial clerk, “I came to work here because I wanted to stop the 
violence; I wanted law to be a meaningful tool to constrain the likes 
of Milošević.”85 A staffer in the Chambers at the ICC emphasized the 
court’s solicitude toward victims: “I chose the ICC because we are the 
voice—the only voice—of the victims.”86 Even defense counsel, who 
might be expected to carry a different set of biases, often have 
deeper, systemic goals of strengthening international law.87 Some 
defense counsel admit that they took their jobs because they wanted 
to help develop international criminal justice.88 Others had more 
explicit agendas: “My primary motivation was the fact that the 
conflicts that led to the war [in Rwanda] and crimes in the respective 
countries were a result of foreign interference, neocolonialism, lack of 
democracy, poverty and economic exploitation . . . .”89 
This is not to say that international tribunals or their staffs are 
inherently biased. In fact the ICTY has acquitted a number of 
defendants.90 Rather, tribunal officials routinely stress the importance 
of due process and the rule of law.91 Nonetheless, international 
 
 84. Judge Philippe Kirsch, President, ICC, Statement at the Ceremony for the Solemn 
Undertaking of the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (June 16, 2003), 
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/6A3D5C50-CB29-4C1B-AFDD-CFE40CA535 
39/146377/PK_20030616_En1.pdf (“We are part of humanity’s response to the countless victims 
and their plight . . . .”); Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Statement at the Ceremony for the Solemn 
Undertaking of the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (June 16, 2003), 
available at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/MorenoOcampo16June03.pdf (describing the 
mission to punish atrocities and protect victims). 
 85. Interview with anonymous Staff Official, Office of the Prosecutor, ICTY, in The 
Hague, Neth. (Oct. 23, 2008). 
 86. Interview with anonymous Staff Official, ICC, in The Hague, Neth. (Oct. 24, 2008). 
 87. But see Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Defense Perspectives on Law and Politics in 
International Criminal Trials, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 529, 549 (2008) (suggesting that “most lawyers 
are not driven by political or ideological motivations in their representation of international 
criminal defendants”). 
 88. Id. at 548. 
 89. Id. at 549 n.77. 
 90. See ICTY Acquittals, http://www.icty.org/sid/9984 (last visited Nov. 30, 2009). 
 91. E.g., Kirsch, supra note 84 (describing the ICC’s “commitment to independence, 
transparency, and the Rule of Law”). 
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criminal law’s civilizing mission is pervasive and powerful. In mindset, 
if not openly, tribunal staff may be inclined to presume guilt, to view 
convictions as more important than process, and to base charging 
decisions more on potential impact than on evidence. As one ICTY 
judicial assistant stated in a blunt and perhaps extreme admission: 
“Of course we have a presumption of innocence here, but . . . we all 
know they are guilty. Our job is to convict them according to the 
law.”92 This mission to convict threatens fair, dispassionate 
adjudication. 
Domestic criminal justice offers two useful ways to limit this 
troubling missionary ideology: differentiated worldviews and venue 
changes. The missionary mindset spans all three international 
branches: prosecutors, defense counsel, and judges’ chambers. This 
imbalance subverts judges’ and defense counsel’s ability to check and 
balance prosecutors. In contrast, though domestic prosecutors seek 
convictions to incapacitate and inflict retribution,93 other actors have 
different roles. Domestic defense attorneys often want to help the less 
fortunate, to rehabilitate perpetrators, or to uphold the integrity of 
the system through strong criminal defense.94 And judges generally 
strive to be neutral, to guarantee fair proceedings and due process. 
The variety of perspectives creates equilibrium, checking 
prosecutorial zeal even within an adversarial system. 
To guarantee the system’s integrity, international criminal justice 
needs a broader range of viewpoints. Instead of relying exclusively on 
international legal idealists, international courts should also tap 
domestic judiciaries. Domestic judges and law clerks are used to 
remaining neutral and even-handed in less public and sensational 
cases; domestic defense lawyers understand the need to defend 
zealously instead of presuming guilt. As we discuss below, one way to 
diversify the ideologies of international tribunal staff would be to 
have national systems temporarily detail their personnel to 
international courts for short- or medium-term rotations.95 In 
addition, signing bonuses or similar incentives could help recruit 
 
 92. Interview with anonymous Staff Official, supra note 85. 
 93. See, e.g., JOHN KROGER, CONVICTIONS: A PROSECUTOR’S BATTLE AGAINST MAFIA 
KILLERS, DRUG KINGPINS, AND ENRON THIEVES 11–22 (2008). 
 94. See, e.g., KEVIN DAVIS, DEFENDING THE DAMNED: INSIDE A DARK CORNER OF THE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 47–59 (2008); MICKEY SHERMAN, HOW CAN YOU DEFEND THESE 
PEOPLE? 31–59 (2008). 
 95. See infra Part II.B. 
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judges, lawyers, and clerks with relevant domestic experience for 
permanent jobs. 
Some international prosecutions also suffer bias because the 
same court has repeatedly heard cases based on identical or similar 
facts. For example, the ICTY repeatedly hears evidence about the 
existence of wars in the Balkans and particular massacres such as 
Srebrenica. Joint trials are often efficient and desirable when 
common facts relate to multiple defendants. Occasionally, however, 
joint trials are infeasible, when, for example, one defendant is 
arrested much later than his alleged accomplices. A court may thus be 
biased or perceived as biased when it has already adjudicated facts 
central to the later defendant’s criminal responsibility. If, for instance, 
previous defendants testified that the current defendant had ordered 
them to kill civilians, the current defendant may find it hard to 
relitigate his command responsibility or role in a joint criminal 
enterprise.96 Domestic procedure deals with this and other problems 
by allowing changes of venue.97 As most international courts consist 
of multiple trial chambers,98 defendants could enjoy the advantages of 
a new venue by being assigned to a different trial chamber.99 When 
the danger of bias is especially grave, a senior official’s later trial 
could occur before an entirely different international court.100 
B. Career Opportunities and Loyalties 
To attract and keep good personnel, international courts need to 
offer them good career prospects. Although staffers can easily move 
laterally from one court to another, they find it very hard to move 
upwards. This acute lack of vertical opportunities undermines morale 
 
 96. For a discussion of these forms of indirect criminal responsibility, see generally Danner 
& Martinez, supra note 7. 
 97. E.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 21(a); see also Laurie L. Levenson, Change of Venue and the 
Role of the Criminal Jury, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1533, 1537 (1993) (discussing the merits of changes 
of venue when jury pools are distinct). 
 98. For a discussion of the structure of the trial chambers at the ICTY, see About the 
ICTY: Chambers, http://www.icty.org/sections/AbouttheICTY/Chambers (last visited Nov. 8, 
2009). 
 99. Presently, trials are assigned to a trial chamber based on docket vacancies. See 
Theodore Meron, Judicial Independence and Impartiality in International Criminal Tribunals, 99 
AM. J. INT’L L. 359, 364 (2005). 
 100. For example, after years of ICTY trials of crimes by Serbian forces, the judges of the 
ICTR could have sat by designation for later trials of senior officials, avoiding bias from 
previously adjudicated evidence. S.C. Res. 827, supra note 3, arts. 12, 13ter–13quater (describing 
the qualifications of ad litem judges and the process for their appointment). 
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and contributes to high turnover. International tribunals thus lack 
continuity, squander human capital, and waste resources training staff 
who remain for only a year or two. 
International criminal tribunals should have no shortage of 
talent. They attract many of the best and brightest internationally 
minded young lawyers from around the world. Moreover, they offer 
relatively generous and often tax-free salaries.101 
One group of lawyers drawn to international criminal courts is 
dubbed a cadre of “post-conflict justice junkies.”102 Justice junkies 
thrive on working in war zones, either to get an adrenaline rush or to 
do some good. They often hop horizontally from court to court, 
conflict to conflict, until they leave the system for personal reasons or 
to settle down. Although they may hope to move upward at a new 
court,103 they care more about the freedom to move to the latest hot 
spot than upward mobility. One former ICC staffer captures the 
mindset of these justice junkies: “I came six months ago, but [am] 
getting restless now. Time to start thinking about [the] next 
opportunity.”104 They remain at a court for only a year or two and 
start looking for their next move almost as soon as they arrive.105 
Another part of the talent pool consists of career seekers. Unlike 
justice junkies, career seekers want more stable job prospects in 
justice or, perhaps, international justice. They may choose a particular 
court for its prestige or the nature of its work, not because it is near 
an active conflict. They want not horizontal but vertical mobility and 
growing responsibilities within a particular court. Yet the structure of 
international courts often fails these career seekers, who are given 
few opportunities to advance. Once they see how limited their career 
trajectory is, career seekers quickly abandon the international judicial 
system for better prospects back home. A former ICTY staffer 
explains: “[I left the Tribunal because] there was nowhere for me to 
 
 101. Salaries at the ICTY are based on UN job classifications and range from $60,000 to 
$80,000 for junior professionals. See UN Human Res. Mgmt., United Nations Salaries, 
Allowances, Benefits and Job Classification, http://www.un.org/Depts/OHRM/salaries_ 
allowances/salary.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2009). 
 102. Elena A. Baylis, Tribunal Hopping with the Post-Conflict Justice Junkies, 10 OR. REV. 
INT’L L. 361, 363 (2008). 
 103. Baylis suggests that the frequent movement of these “justice junkies” may in part be 
driven by the potential for upward mobility at the time of a move to a new court with greater 
staff vacancies. Id. at 374. 
 104. Interview with anonymous Staff Official, supra note 85. 
 105. See Baylis, supra note 102, at 373 (referring to the “short duration[s of] postings”). 
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go. There are very few senior legal officer positions and becoming a 
judge is impossible—they are elected by the Security Council.”106 
Another ICTY staff member put it bluntly: “I came with high hopes 
but they were shattered. I would be stuck as a P-2 forever with an 
iron-ceiling above me. So I packed my bags and left.”107 
Both justice junkies and career seekers have few incentives to 
stay for any length of time, so both groups tend to move on after just 
a year or two. Early departures and high turnover rates have become 
a major problem. The ICTY has recognized that its high staff 
turnover hinders its ability to complete its mission and that existing 
incentives to stay are inadequate.108 Though the ICC is a permanent 
court in no danger of closing, it has similar staff retention problems. 
In its first three years, the prosecutor’s office had lost twenty-two of 
its 146 staffers, fourteen of whom left before their contracts had 
ended.109 Anecdotal evidence suggests that the prosecutorial turnover 
rate has increased since 2006 and that judicial chambers and defense 
counsel face similar retention problems.110 
Some staff attrition is unavoidable, but high turnover rates drain 
human capital. Although longer employment contracts and financial 
incentives to renew could keep justice junkies in place slightly longer, 
they are likely to tribunal-hop regardless. There is more hope for 
remedying the plight of career seekers.111 The UN Common System, 
which international tribunals use,112 limits professional advancement 
 
 106. Interview with former Staff Member, ICTY, in N.Y., N.Y. (Jan. 15, 2009). 
 107. Telephone Interview with former Staff Member, ICTY (Jan. 18, 2009). 
 108. Letter from Patrick Robinson, President, ICTY, to President, UN Sec. Council, para. 
30 (Nov. 21, 2008), available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/Reports%20and%20 
Publications/CompletionStrategy/Completion_Strategy_24nov2008_en.pdf. 
 109. Office of the Prosecutor, ICC, Report on the Activities Performed During the First 
Three Years (June 2003 – June 2006), para. 74 (Sept. 12, 2006), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/D76A5D89-FB64-47A9-9821-725747378AB2/143680/OTP_3yearreport 
20060914_English.pdf; see also Dr. Edmond H. Wellenstein, Dir.-Gen., Task Force ICC, 
Statement at the 2d Public Hearing of the Office of the Prosecutor (Sept. 25, 2006), available at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Structure+of+the+Court/Office+of+the+Prosecutor/Network 
+with+Partners/Public+Hearings/Second+Public+Hearing/Session+1/Dr+Edmond+H++Wellen
stein+Director+General+Task+Force+ICC.htm (demanding that the Prosecutor address staff 
turnover). 
 110. Interview with anonymous Staff Official, supra note 86. 
 111. See Office of the Prosecutor, supra note 109, para. 74 (“[T]he Office seeks to attract the 
most qualified individuals in the field of international justice.”). 
 112. See Assembly of State Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
Res. ICC-ASP/2/Res.2 passim (Sept. 12, 2003), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_ 
docs/Resolutions/ICC-ASP-ASP2-Res-02-ENG.pdf (requiring that the ICC establish terms of 
employment consistent with the UN Common System for ICC employees). For a discussion of 
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and bases promotions more on seniority than on merit.113 Staff who 
left institutions that use this system cite lack of opportunities for 
professional growth and promotion as the two most common reasons 
for leaving.114 The wide staffing pyramids of international tribunals, 
with many lower-ranked positions and few senior ones, exacerbate 
the problem of career advancement.115 Moreover, the most senior 
positions, such as tribunal judges, are permanently out of reach, filled 
through political elections. 
Domestic career paths offer a promising alternative. Domestic 
prosecutors and public defenders can move up to supervisory 
positions and more desirable units based on talent and hard work as 
well as seniority.116 In some countries, such as Germany, the judiciary 
is a meritocratic civil service.117 Career seekers could begin in the 
domestic system, be seconded (detailed) to international courts for a 
time, and later move up the ladder by returning to their domestic 
systems. Justice Jackson, who took a leave from the Supreme Court 
to serve as the U.S. Chief Prosecutor at Nuremberg, is perhaps the 
best example of how secondment can bring valuable skills and 
expertise. Though secondment of domestic officials to international 
tribunals occurs occasionally, it should become the norm, not the 
exception. The ICC could expand its existing cooperation agreements 
 
the United Nations Common System, see UN Human Res. Mgmt., UN Common System, 
http://www.un.org/Depts/OHRM/salaries_allowances/common.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2009). 
 113. See Glentis T. Thomas, 2d Sec’y, Delegation of Ant. & Barb., Statement on Behalf of 
the Group of Seventy-Seven and China on Agenda Item 125: United Nations Common System, 
in the 5th Committee During the Main Part of the 63d Session of the General Assembly ¶ 5 
(Oct. 27, 2008), available at http://www.g77.org/statement/getstatement.php?id=081027a (“It is 
important to underline that lack of opportunities for career development was cited in most cases 
in headquarters locations as the main cause of voluntary turnover . . . .”); see also Alexander 
Downer, MP, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Reinvigorating the United Nations: Reform, Rights 
and Reconfiguration, Address Before the 52d Session of the General Assembly (Oct. 3, 1997), 
available at http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/1997/unga3october97.html (noting the 
disproportionate role played by seniority). 
 114. HUMAN RES. POLICY DIV., INT’L CIVIL SERV. COMM’N, RESULTS OF THE GLOBAL 
STAFF SURVEY ON RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION (2008), http://icsc.un.org/resources/hrpd/ 
gssr/docs/ICSCStaffsurvey.pdf. 
 115. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 5, arts. 36, 42 
(describing the qualification and election of judges and the Prosecutor). 
 116. Of course, politics also plays a large role in American states’ and counties’ elections for 
district attorneys and judges. We do not wish to replicate every quirk of the American system, 
particularly its politicization, but simply to suggest the need for incentives to work hard and 
perform well to get ahead. 
 117. See John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 
823, 853 (1985) (noting that the German civil service system prevents politics from influencing 
the appointment and promotion of judges at most levels). 
BIBAS & BURKE-WHITE IN FINAL 12/15/2009 11:42:20 AM 
2010] INTERNATIONAL IDEALISM 667 
with its States Parties to facilitate secondment and to improve 
candidates’ postsecondment prospects back home. National civil 
services could amend their personnel and benefits policies to promote 
international secondments as valuable credentials for career 
advancement. 
Routine secondment of career seekers could also alleviate the 
problematic worldview that many international tribunal staff now 
share.118 Having been socialized within national judicial systems, 
secondees are more likely to have diverse ideologies befitting their 
roles, instead of categorically leaning toward conviction. 
More generally, the UN Common System and the international 
civil service urgently need reform. Though a detailed exploration of 
these points is beyond the scope of this Article, civil-service systems 
should allow for rapid advancement based on merit, create incentives 
to retain good staff, and facilitate careers that bridge international 
and domestic service. 
III.  THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 
Though international criminal justice seeks to tame politics 
through law, it remains deeply political. Politics infects the election 
and appointment of key officials, state cooperation in investigations 
and arrests, and court funding. It skews outcomes, weakens 
independence, and undercuts the appearance of impartiality. 
Domestic judiciaries offer examples of how to insulate justice from 
politics and how to acknowledge and defuse the politics that remains. 
This Part explores the politics of international criminal justice 
and draws lessons from domestic judiciaries. First, we consider the 
politics and elections of judges, prosecutors, and other senior officials. 
Next, we turn to a unique aspect of international criminal justice—the 
need for state cooperation to conduct investigations or undertake 
arrests. Third, we examine the politics of funding international 
tribunals. Finally, we consider the politics of defense resources and 
the need to ensure equality of arms. 
A. Appointments and Elections 
International prosecutors and judges are elected or appointed by 
processes that often turn into political beauty pageants. To give but 
one example, when judicial vacancies arise on the ICTY, the UN 
 
 118. See supra Part II.A. 
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Secretary General solicits each state to nominate up to two 
candidates. The Security Council then narrows the slate to a 
maximum of forty-two candidates. The General Assembly elects 
judges for four-year terms with the possibility of reappointment.119 
International tribunals’ statutes impose additional requirements that 
further politicize selection. For example, ICC judges must be diverse 
in geography and sex and represent the world’s main legal systems.120 
The cumbersome electoral system injects dysfunctional 
international politics into law. Many states nominate candidates 
based on patronage, not merit.121 For judges from developing states, 
an international judicial appointment with its relatively high salary is 
a plum political appointment. One notable case of presumed political 
cronyism involved a Nigerian judge at the ICTY who routinely slept 
through trials but was nonetheless nominated by his government for 
reelection.122 Political horse-trading can also lead to the selection of 
less qualified candidates. Thomas Franck analogized the UN General 
Assembly not to a principled court “but a bazaar, with its emphasis 
on price and trade.”123 In this context, bloc politics, bargaining, and 
horse-trading matter more than merit. 
Take, for example, the 2003 election of the ICC’s first group of 
judges. The election of eighteen judges took thirty-three rounds of 
voting over three days. The eighty-five voting states had to select 
 
 119. S.C. Res. 827, supra note 3, art. 13bis. The UN Security Council elects the ICTY 
Prosecutor, subject to veto by permanent members. Id. art. 16(4). ICC judicial appointments are 
likewise politicized. Each state party nominates one candidate. Candidates with criminal 
procedure experience compose one list; those with international law expertise form a second. 
The States Parties then elect judges from these lists by a two-thirds vote. Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, supra note 5, art. 36. The Assembly of States Parties (ASP) 
creates a list of candidates for head ICC Prosecutor and elects the Prosecutor by secret ballot. 
The Prosecutor then puts forth a list of three candidates for each deputy prosecutor job, and the 
States Parties likewise elect them by secret ballot. Id. art. 42(4). 
 120. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 5, art. 36(8). The ICTY 
statute requires that judicial elections take “due account of the adequate representation of the 
principal legal systems of the world.” S.C. Res. 827, supra note 3, art. 13bis(1)(c). 
 121. Studies of the election of judges to the European Court of Human Rights offer strong 
evidence that patronage plays a large part in nominations. See JUTTA LIMBACH ET AL., 
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: LAW AND PRACTICE OF APPOINTMENTS TO THE EUROPEAN 
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 9 (2003) (“[N]omination often involves a ‘tap on the shoulder’ from 
the Minister of Justice or Foreign Affairs, and frequently rewards political loyalty more than 
merit.”). 
 122. Erik Voeten, The Politics of International Judicial Appointments, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 387, 
398 (2009). 
 123. Thomas M. Franck, Of Gnats and Camels: Is There a Double Standard at the United 
Nations?, 78 AM. J. INT’L L. 811, 833 (1984). 
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candidates according to prescribed ratios of criminal-justice experts to 
international experts, men to women, and various geographic 
regions.124 Ballots that did not meet these criteria were excluded, 
which may have compromised the validity of the election.125 
Geographic and bloc politics resulted in bargaining and horse-trading 
that may have hampered the selection of the most qualified judges.126 
Problematic backroom deals aside, the prospect of reelection 
creates troubling incentives for sitting international judges and 
prosecutors. When reelection is possible, judges and prosecutors’ 
interests may be more aligned with the states that nominated or 
supported them than with justice itself.127 Desire for reappointment 
can also create conflicts of interest. For example, an ICTY advisory 
committee decided not to investigate possible international crimes by 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces during the war in 
Kosovo,128 and ICTY Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte accepted this 
recommendation.129 Because her reappointment required the support 
of the U.S. and the U.K., which had led the NATO bombing 
campaign, her decision appeared to be less than independent or 
impartial.130 
Although some horse-trading is unavoidable given the small 
electorate of repeat players, reforms can limit its pernicious effects. 
 
 124. Some commentators suggest that the ASP had to elect a minimum of six women and 
three judges each from Africa, Latin America, and Western Europe, and two from Asia. Darin 
R. Bartram & David B. Rivkin, Jr., The ICC’s First False Step, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 2003, at A9. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Candidates spent weeks before the election in a “beauty contest” at the UN involving 
substantial cross-issue bargaining. See Lauren Etter, Call for ICC to Learn ICTY Election 
Lessons, INST. FOR WAR & PEACE REPORTING, Nov. 26, 2004, http://www.globalpolicy.org/ 
component/content/article/164-icc/28481.html (describing the perception of some judges and 
observers that the elections were determined by political deal-making); cf. Bartram & Rivkin, 
supra note 124 (suggesting the election was tainted). But see Leila Nadya Sadat, Summer in 
Rome, Spring in the Hague, Winter in Washington? U.S. Policy Towards the International 
Criminal Court, 21 WIS. INT’L L.J. 557, 581–82 (2003) (suggesting that the elected judges were 
qualified). 
 127. See Voeten, supra note 122, at 389 (suggesting that international judges “depend in 
large measure on the willingness of national governments to advance their candidacies for high 
international judicial office”). 
 128. Office of the Prosecutor, ICTY, Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee 
Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, ¶ 91 (June 13, 2000), available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/Press/nato061300.pdf 
(recommending that the NATO bombing campaign not be investigated). 
 129. Paolo Benvenuti, The ICTY Prosecutor and the Review of the NATO Bombing 
Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 503, 505 (2001). 
 130. See id. (questioning Del Ponte’s decision). 
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Truly secret ballots make it impossible to enforce backroom 
bargains.131 Alternatively, a fully independent committee could 
propose a slate of candidates for an up-or-down vote, thereby at least 
preventing horse-trading of appointments on the floor of the General 
Assembly. Raising the prerequisites for nomination, such as 
education levels and years of judicial service, can ensure that whoever 
is elected will be qualified.132 Unavoidable bargaining should at least 
be more public, so that NGOs and the press can scrutinize deals and 
domestic voters can hold their governments accountable for the 
bargains they strike. 
Domestic judiciaries have considerable experience with 
reappointment and reelection. The need to run for reelection skews 
judicial incentives and outcomes. For example, American state trial 
judges often face popular reelection and are therefore likely to be 
more punitive in sentencing, presumably in an effort to be seen as 
tough on crime.133 Concerns abound that periodic elections undermine 
judges’ independence and impartiality.134 As Alexander Hamilton 
foresaw, “[p]eriodical appointments, however regulated, or by 
whomsoever made, would, in some way or other, be fatal to their 
necessary independence.”135 To solve this problem, international 
courts should move from short, renewable terms toward a single, 
longer term of service. The Rome Statute has appropriately moved in 
this direction, providing that from now on the ICC’s judges and 
 
 131. Elections for ICTY judges do not use secret ballots. See S.C. Res. 827, supra note 3, art. 
13bis (describing the procedure for judicial elections). The ICC improved on this model by 
requiring the use of a secret ballot. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra 
note 5, art. 36(6). 
 132. The ICC has taken an appropriate step in this direction, requiring that judicial 
nominees be qualified to serve in the highest judicial office in their home states, have experience 
in criminal law or international law, and have excellent knowledge of one of the court’s official 
languages. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 5, art. 36(3). More 
explicit qualifications and strict enforcement would help. 
 133. See Gregory A. Huber & Sanford C. Gordon, Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice 
Blind when It Runs for Office?, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 247, 261 (2004) (concluding that as judicial 
elections approach, judges impose increasingly punitive sentences); cf. Richard A. Posner, What 
Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. 
REV. 1, 41 (1993) (suggesting that elected judges are more susceptible to political influence). 
 134. See Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of 
Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 694 (1995) (suggesting that the majoritarian difficulty associated 
with elected judges may not be compatible with constitutional democracy); Joseph R. Grodin, 
Developing a Consensus of Constraint: A Judge’s Perspective on Judicial Retention Elections, 61 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1969, 1979–83 (1988) (suggesting that judicial elections pose a threat to the 
integrity of the courts). 
 135. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 471 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
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Prosecutor will serve one nonrenewable nine-year term.136 Nine years 
may suffice, or we may find that judges still cultivate relations with 
patron governments to secure future jobs after their current ones end. 
If that happens, even longer terms could turn international judicial 
appointments from stepping stones to the capstone of a judge’s 
career. 
B. State Cooperation 
International courts need states to cooperate with them. They 
cannot search for evidence, compel witnesses, or arrest suspects 
without the help of states, which are all too often uncooperative. 
Some courts, such as Nuremberg, enjoyed good cooperation because 
the Allied nations running the tribunal occupied and controlled the 
remnants of the German state.137 But the ICTY and ICTR face much 
more difficulty, even though international law obligates states to help 
locate persons, take testimony, request evidence, serve documents, 
and arrest suspects.138 Most notoriously, for thirteen years the ICTY 
could not arrest the two masterminds of the Balkan war, Radovan 
Karadžić or Ratko Mladić. For most of the thirteen years, Bosnian 
authorities and even NATO troops knew where Karadžić was but 
lacked the will to arrest him.139 Not until July 2008 did Serbian 
authorities arrest him, under the threat of sanctions, promises of 
financial aid, and a change in domestic government.140 Worse, Mladić 
still remains at large, hiding in plain sight in Serbia.141 These delays 
 
 136. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 5, arts. 36(9)(a), 42(4). 
 137. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal Annexed to the London Agreement 
for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, supra 
note 18, 82 U.N.T.S. at 294, art. 17 (enumerating the powers of the Tribunal). See generally 
EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION (1993) (providing an overview 
of international humanitarian law governing occupied territories). 
 138. S.C. Res. 827, supra note 3, art. 29(2); id. ¶ 4. Decisions of the Security Council taken 
under Chapter VII are binding on all UN member states. U.N. Charter art. 25. 
 139. See Carla Del Ponte, Hiding in Plain Sight, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2003, at A15 (“It is 
clear that NATO and the authorities in Serbia and Montenegro know even more about 
[Karadžić and Mladić’s] whereabouts . . . . The time has come to summon the will and bring 
[them] to justice.”). 
 140. See Finally, Nowhere to Hide, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2008, at A20. Karadžić’s arrest was 
motivated by economic threats from the United States and the European Union. See David 
Rohde & Marc Lacey, Arrest Helps Tribunals Prosecuting War Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 
2008, at A10. 
 141. Vesna Peric Zimonjic, The Most Wanted Man in Europe: Caught on Video: Ratko 
Mladic, a Fugitive from Global Justice After Ordering the Worst Massacre in Modern Europe, 
Enjoying Life in Serbia, INDEPENDENT (London), June 12, 2009, at 1 (describing film footage of 
BIBAS & BURKE-WHITE IN FINAL 12/15/2009 11:42:20 AM 
672 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:637 
and failures to arrest have slowed the work of the ICTY and called its 
efficacy into question. 
The ICC faces even more daunting challenges. Without state 
assistance, the ICC is truly impotent, unable even to transfer an 
accused already in custody in a foreign jurisdiction to the court.142 Its 
statute binds only States Parties, yet even they often fail to fulfill their 
obligations. The ICC steps in when national governments cannot or 
will not prosecute, but these same states likewise often cannot or will 
not assist the ICC. For example, the leadership of the Lord’s 
Resistance Army, a Ugandan rebel group, remains at large despite 
ICC arrest warrants issued in 2005.143 Though everyone knows that 
the rebels are hiding in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC), the Congolese military cannot and will not arrest them.144 
Even more troubling, the UN Mission in the DRC could arrest them 
but has shown little political will to do so.145 
Perhaps the most powerful example of the ICC’s need for state 
cooperation is its efforts in Sudan. Initially, Sudan defied ICC arrest 
warrants for two leaders of the Darfur genocide, including one sitting 
minister of the Sudanese government, and threatened ICC staff and 
witnesses.146 As a result, prosecutors must rely on witness interviews 
 
Mladić enjoying living openly in a Belgrade suburb, allegedly as recently as 2008, though 
Serbian officials insist the footage is much older). 
 142. When Thomas Lubanga Dyilo was arrested by Congolese authorities in Kinshasa, the 
ICC lacked the means to physically transfer him to the Hague. Eventually, the French 
government provided transport. See BBC News, Profile: DR Congo Militia Leader Thomas 
Lubanga, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6131516.stm (last visited Nov. 8, 2009). 
 143. See Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Decision on the Prosecutor’s 
Application for Warrants of Arrest Under Article 58 (July 8, 2005). 
 144. See Letter from Jane Kiggundu, Solicitor Gen., Gov’t of Uganda, to the Registrar, ICC 
(Mar. 27, 2008), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/cases/ICC-02-04-01-05-286-Anx2-
ENG.pdf. 
 145. See Scott Baldauf, Legacy of Rwanda’s Genocide: More Assertive International Justice, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 7, 2009, at 6 (discussing MONUC’s politically motivated 
decision not to arrest Congolese rebels); MONUC, Democratic Republic of the Congo - 
MONUC - Mandate, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/monuc/mandate.html (last visited 
Nov. 8, 2009) (explaining that the 2004 revision of the original mandate includes the new 
responsibility to contribute to the disarmament of Congolese combatants). In early 2009, the 
UN Mission in the DRC unsuccessfully attempted an arrest but has otherwise been reluctant to 
act. See Jeffrey Gettleman & Eric Schmitt, U.S. Aided a Failed Plan to Rout Ugandan Rebels, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2009, at A1. 
 146. See Maggie Farley, Warrants Issued in Darfur Conflict: U.N. Court Seeks the Arrests of 
a State Official and a Militia Leader, but Sudan Appears Unlikely to Hand Them Over, L.A. 
TIMES, May 3, 2007, at A3; Eric Reeves, Obama, Darfur, and ICC Justice, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, Nov. 24, 2008, at 9; see also OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, ICC, SECOND REPORT OF 
THE PROSECUTOR OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, MR. LUIS MORENO-OCAMPO, 
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in neighboring countries’ refugee camps.147 When the ICC Prosecutor 
so indicted Sudanese President Bashir, the African Union (AU) as 
well as some leading NGOs and academics loudly criticized the court, 
condemning its legitimacy and vilifying its Prosecutor.148 If key states 
took the approach adopted by the AU, the ICC’s indictments and the 
institution itself would be an empty threat. Cooperation, however, is 
about far more than public rhetoric, and the AU’s statements may say 
more about Sudan’s influence in the organization than the actual 
willingness of states to assist the court. The real questions are whether 
Western powers will pressure Sudan and its neighbors, whether key 
African states will deny him entry and safe transit, whether domestic 
audiences will force him from power as they did Milošević, and 
whether he can be arrested while abroad. In at least some of those 
respects, the court’s prospects appear more promising149 but remain 
dependent on astute diplomacy and ongoing state cooperation. 
Though international tribunals need state cooperation and 
support, at the same time getting too close to any one nation would 
call into question their independence and impartiality. When the ICC 
Prosecutor opened his investigation in Uganda in 2004, he sought to 
establish a close relationship with President Museveni to allow the 
 
TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL PURSUANT TO UNSC 1593, at 4 (2005), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/2CFC1123-B4DF-4FEB-BEF4-52E0CAC8AA79/0/LMO_UNSC_Report 
B_En.pdf (noting a “climate of insecurity” and the “absence of an effective system of 
protection” for victims and witnesses in Sudan). 
 147. See Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor, ICC, Statement to the U.N. Security 
Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (Dec. 14, 2006), available at http://www.icc-cpi. 
int/NR/rdonlyres/4B0CCA58-55A5-4428-9886-9DE1DB5BB24F/0/LMQ20061216_en.pdf 
(noting investigation difficulties due to the lack of Sudanese cooperation). 
 148. See Assembly of the African Union, Decision on the Meeting of African States Parties to 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Assembly/AU/Dec.245(XIII) (July 
1–3, 2009) (condemning the indictment of Bashir); Jeffrey Gettleman, As Charges Loom, Sudan 
Chief Mounts Charm Offensive, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2008, at A6 (discussing Sudan’s efforts to 
persuade powerful states on the Security Council to block efforts to arrest Bashir); Neil 
MacFarquhar, Accusations Against Leader of Sudan Fuel Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2008, at 
A15. Though not a State Party, Sudan is legally obligated to cooperate with the ICC by UN 
Security Council Resolution 1593. S.C. Res. 1593, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005); 
see also Eric Posner, The Limits of Global Legalism, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, July 3, 2009, 
http://volokh.com/posts/1246649185.shtml (noting a treaty obligation to arrest Sudan’s 
president). 
 149. Bashir has, for example, failed to attend summit meetings in some African states due to 
fear of arrest. See Uganda Says Sudan’s Bashir to Send Deputy over ICC, REUTERS, July 16, 
2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSLG94343 (noting that Sudan would send a 
deputy to a summit in Uganda after Uganda indicated that it might act on the ICC arrest 
warrant). 
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smooth functioning of his investigation.150 Yet, the ICC Prosecutor’s 
now-infamous handshake with Museveni, which signaled that the 
court would not investigate potential crimes by government forces, 
led many Ugandans to view the Prosecutor as Museveni’s puppet.151 
Hybrid tribunals face different problems. Because they are 
rooted in a national judiciary, they depend on the host state’s 
assistance and support.152 Although they can harness a domestic 
government’s coercive capacity, they have difficulty securing evidence 
from or arresting suspects in other states.153 Moreover, hybrids risk 
being co-opted by domestic authorities. The Extraordinary Chambers 
in Cambodia, for example, have been widely criticized as a pawn of 
the Cambodian government.154 The balance between cooperation and 
co-option is precarious. 
Solutions to the state cooperation dilemma are more often 
political than legal.155 Realistically, international tribunals will not 
have their own police powers in the foreseeable future. There are, 
however, four broad ways to mitigate the problems of state 
cooperation. First, international tribunals should seek greater 
cooperation from and deeper integration with clean-handed, helpful 
states. The ICC must urge, prod, and cajole the 108 States Parties, 
especially those that are not likely to be the site of an investigation, to 
 
 150. OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, ICC, PAPER ON SOME POLICY ISSUES BEFORE THE 
OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR 2 (2003), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/ 
1FA7C4C6-DE5F-42B7-8B25-60AA962ED8B6/143594/030905_Policy_Paper.pdf (discussing 
the need for close state cooperation). 
 151. For a discussion of the perception of bias generated by this meeting, see Zachary A. 
Lomo, Why the International Criminal Court Must Withdraw Indictments Against the Top LRA 
Leaders: A Legal Perspective, SUNDAY MONITOR (Kampala), Aug. 20, 2006, available at 
http://www.refugeelawproject.org/press_releases/press_whyICCmustwithdraw.pdf. 
 152. See Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on 
the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, U.N.-Sierra Leone, art. 17, Jan. 16, 2002, 
2178 U.N.T.S. 138, available at http://www.specialcourt.org/documents/SpecialCourtAgreement 
Final.pdf (providing for cooperation by the government). 
 153. The STL has difficulty investigating because Syria is uncooperative. See generally S.C. 
Res. 1644, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1644 (Dec. 15, 2005) (condemning Syria for its lack of cooperation 
with the ICC). 
 154. See Suzannah Linton, Safeguarding the Independence and Impartiality of the 
Cambodian Extraordinary Chambers, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 327, 340 (2006). 
 155. Existing formal legal obligations to cooperate have proved insufficient to motivate 
unwilling states. For example, Sudan faces an obligation under UN Security Council Resolution 
1593 to “cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the Court.” S.C. Res. 
1593, supra note 148, ¶ 2. Yet Sudan has failed to arrest any of the indictees on its territory. 
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assist international tribunals.156 Though astute diplomacy is a good 
first step,157 tribunals also need deeper integration into clean-handed 
states’ domestic legal systems. Extradition could become as routine as 
it is between American states, without the need to jump through 
cumbersome treaty procedures. Likewise, courts need intelligence-
sharing arrangements, so that international authorities have access to 
domestic wiretaps and other information. Working directly with 
national enforcement officials would be faster, more efficient, and 
less political than having to funnel requests through a political 
bottleneck of a state’s foreign ministry.158 Cooperation agreements 
could authorize international courts to requisition transport 
assistance, collect evidence, or execute warrants through a national 
judiciary, rather than through a state’s foreign ministry.159 By 
bypassing foreign ministries, international and domestic courts and 
police could cooperate as smoothly as American state and federal 
authorities do in arresting, extraditing, and sharing information. 
Second, international tribunals should use issue linkages and 
sanctions to pressure uncooperative states. Although international 
tribunals themselves have few levers to coerce unwilling national 
governments, third-party states and international organizations can 
pressure uncooperative states by linking cooperation to trade 
benefits, foreign aid, and sanctions. The 2008 arrest of Radovan 
Karadžić, noted above, was motivated by the threat of European 
Union sanctions and the promise of significant financial incentives.160 
 
 156. For various statements by national governments in support of the ICC, see Burke-
White, supra note 9, at 60 nn.23–28. 
 157. The Jurisdiction, Cooperation and Complementarity Division of the Office of the 
Prosecutor is responsible for diplomacy. It needs to be more proactive and better solicit the 
support of national governments. See Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor, ICC, Remarks 
at the 27th Meeting of the Committee of Legal Advisers on Public International Law (Mar. 18, 
2004), available at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/ICCProsecutorCADHI18Mar04.pdf. 
 158. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 5, art. 87 (providing 
statutory authority for communication with States Parties and specifying the use of “the 
diplomatic channel”); see also ICC R. P. & EVID. 176–77 (delineating responsibilities for 
communications among organs of the court). 
 159. Many states would have to pass implementing legislation to allow international 
tribunals to directly interface with and activate domestic institutions. Americans may see such 
unlimited cooperation as far-fetched, but some European states, such as France, have amended 
their constitutions to conform to the Rome Statute and could be convinced to provide deeper 
cooperation. See generally Michael P. Hatchell, Note, Closing the Gaps in United States Law and 
Implementing the Rome Statute: A Comparative Approach, 12 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 183 
(2005) (discussing domestic implementation of the Rome Statute). 
 160. See Rohde & Lacey, supra note 140. 
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Third, international tribunals should consider offering sentence 
discounts and plea agreements in exchange for cooperation and self-
surrender to reduce their dependence on state cooperation. In this 
vein, American criminal procedure already offers discounts to induce 
defendants to turn themselves in, plead guilty, not file motions, and 
cooperate. Sentence discounts for self-surrender could provide 
incentive for indictees to submit themselves to the tribunal, without 
the need to get state assistance to make arrests. Cooperative states 
could also freeze assets automatically upon indictment, increasing the 
pressure to surrender. Similarly, as Part IV.B discusses, cooperation 
agreements could induce testimony, reducing the need for in-country 
interviews or forensic evidence collection. Though far from ideal, 
these discounts may be necessary to circumvent political roadblocks 
to justice. 
Finally, as a last resort, regime change may be the only available 
way to deal with a state that systematically harbors international 
fugitives. An indictment and arrest warrant from an international 
tribunal may provide a rallying point around which victims and 
opposition can unite to force an international criminal from power or 
to pressure a government to turn over a suspect.161 Slobodan 
Milošević, for example, was ultimately arrested after a domestic 
uprising in Serbia toppled his regime.162 The closest domestic 
analogue is that officials who shelter criminal cronies risk electoral 
defeat, impeachment, and even federal civil-rights prosecution.163 
C. Funding 
International tribunals likewise depend on national governments 
for their funding, either directly or through international 
organizations, which raises two concerns. First, funding may be 
inadequate.164 The ICC’s €66.8 million budget allocation for 2006 fell 
 
 161. These efforts must be undertaken carefully given the possibility of nationalist backlash. 
For example, the ICC Prosecutor’s request for an indictment of the Sudanese president led to 
rallies of support in Khartoum. See Lydia Polgreen & Jeffrey Gettleman, Sudan Rallies Behind 
Leader Reviled Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2008, at A1. 
 162. See CHRIS STEPHEN, JUDGEMENT DAY: THE TRIAL OF SLOBODAN MILOŠEVIĆ 145, 
155–62 (2004). 
 163. Most famously, President Gerald Ford’s pardon of former President Richard Nixon is 
thought to have doomed whatever hopes he had for reelection. Lionel Van Deerlin, Gerald 
Ford: The Right President for His Time, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., May 9, 2001, at B7. 
 164. Although the ASP has been relatively generous thus far, that generosity may not 
continue. See, e.g., ICC, Report of the Committee on Budget and Finance on the Work of Its Sixth 
Session, ICC-ASP/05/01 (May 4, 2006), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ 
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short of the court’s request and required the ICC to scale back certain 
programs and staffing.165 The ICTY and ICTR have likewise 
experienced significant budget pressure as states have sought to 
curtail their contributions to the UN.166 Funding constraints can limit a 
tribunal’s staffing, prevent new investigations, or impair responses to 
unforeseen developments.167 Hybrid tribunals face even greater 
operational constraints, as they depend on the support of poorer host 
states and on voluntary contributions that richer states sometimes 
promise but do not deliver.168 In 2008, the Cambodia tribunal began 
pleading for additional funding so that it could begin its first trial.169 
Second, financial dependence can compromise independence 
and impartiality. Funding often turns on the support of rich, powerful 
states. When the ICTY Prosecutor decided not to investigate crimes 
by NATO forces in Kosovo and Serbia, she might have feared that 
such an investigation would jeopardize the U.S.’s and U.K.’s financial 
support. The ICC Prosecutor’s decision not to investigate crimes by 
British forces in Iraq raised the same question of independence.170 
 
library/asp/ICC-ASP-5-1_English.pdf. For information on presently available finances, see ICC, 
Financial Statements for the Period 1 January to 31 December 2005, ICC-ASP/05/02 (Aug. 8, 
2006), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/library/asp/ICC-ASP-5-2_English.pdf. 
 165. Jonathan O’Donohue, The 2005 Budget of the International Criminal Court: 
Contingency, Insufficient Funding in Key Areas and the Recurring Question of the Independence 
of the Prosecutor, 18 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 591, 593 (2005). 
 166. ICTY and ICTR funding comes through assessed contributions to the UN, whereby 
states are required to pay a portion of the UN budget. Etelle R. Higonnet, Restructuring Hybrid 
Courts: Local Empowerment and National Criminal Justice Reform, 23 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. 
L. 347, 427 (2006). Because ICTY and ICTR expenses are more than 10 percent of the UN’s 
annual budget, reductions in tribunal budgets can decrease assessed contributions. See David 
Wippman, The Costs of International Justice, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 861, 861 (2006). 
 167. In 2009, for example, the ICC staff was limited to 744 persons with a budget of about 
€100 million. Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, Res. ICC-ASP/7/Res.4 (Nov. 21, 2008). That budget may preclude new investigations and 
will be a factor in how ongoing investigations are conducted. 
 168. See Higonnet, supra note 166, at 427. Many of the pledges to the State Court of Bosnia 
& Herzegovina have not been delivered. See COURT OF BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA, PROJECT 
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN PROGRESS REPORT 35 (Oct. 2004), available at http://www. 
registrarbih.gov.ba/files/docs/WCC_Project_Plan_201004_complete.pdf. 
 169. See Paul Watson, Special Cambodian Court Short of Funds, L.A. TIMES, June 24, 2008, 
at A4. 
 170. See Letter from Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor, ICC, to Senders of 
Communications Regarding Iraq (Feb. 9, 2006), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/ 
rdonlyres/04D143C8-19FB-466C-AB77-
4CDB2FDEBEF7/143682/OTP_letter_to_senders_re_Iraq_9_February_2006.pdf (noting that 
“the Statute requirements to seek authorization to initiate an investigation in the situation in 
Iraq have not been satisfied”). 
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Several innovations could better insulate international courts 
from the political pressures of securing funding and the perceptions of 
bias. First, international tribunals should develop standby reserve 
funds to cushion them against real or threatened budget cuts.171 
Second, soliciting donations could provide a further buffer against 
budgetary threats. Third, courts could forfeit and seize convicts’ 
funds, furthering financial independence. The Rome Statute already 
allows the ICC to impose financial penalties on those convicted of 
international crimes.172 Presently, seized funds and fines are 
earmarked for a trust fund for the benefit of victims and witnesses.173 
Many warlords have stashed away millions or billions from their 
plunder, so courts could consider splitting proceeds among victims, 
witnesses, and court systems. American experiences here suggest 
proceeding with caution.174 There is a danger that prosecutors might 
target the wealthy to enhance their budget, so rules need to insulate 
case selection against this danger. Finally, international courts could 
stretch their dollars by streamlining procedures along American lines. 
For example, Parts IV.B and IV.C suggest, they could make greater 
use of plea bargaining and cooperation discounts. 
D. Defense Resources 
The politics of funding has especially grave consequences for 
defense lawyering. Despite significant reforms,175 the ICTY legal aid 
system discourages zealous litigation. Defense counsel receive set 
lump sums for pretrial, trial, and appeals work based on the 
 
 171. A variant of this approach has been used by hybrid tribunals, whereby establishment is 
conditioned on an adequate “donors fund.” See COURT OF BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA, supra 
note 168, at 35. 
 172. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 5, art. 77(2). 
 173. Id. art. 79. 
 174. See, e.g., Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Policing for Profit: The Drug War’s Hidden 
Economic Agenda, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 35, 56–82 (1998) (discussing how the prospect of 
forfeiture warps law-enforcement incentives to prosecute drug crimes that are likely to result in 
large forfeitures). For an overview of a recent procedural reform designed to protect innocent 
owners against overzealous, financially motivated law enforcers, see generally Barry L. Johnson, 
The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 and the Prospects for Federal Sentencing Reform, 
14 FED. SENT’G RPTR. 98 (2001). 
 175. See Secretary-General, Comprehensive Report on the Progress Made by the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in Reforming Its Legal Aid System, 
¶¶ 7–39, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. DOC. A/58/288 (Aug. 12, 2003) (outlining 
reforms in 2001 that sought to create incentives for defense counsel to work efficiently and 
control costs). Initially, the ICTY paid defense counsel about one hundred euros per hour, with 
a 175-hour monthly cap. Id. ¶¶ 7–8. 
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complexity of the case.176 Because there is no extra compensation for 
extra hours or dollars spent,177 this lump sum system discourages 
spending much time or money on cases. Moreover, although holding 
back partial payments until the end of a phase may speed up trial, it 
also encourages defense counsel to underlitigate in their haste to 
receive their fees.178 
Defense funding can be even more problematic for hybrid 
tribunals, in which prosecutors are often much more influential than 
legal aid offices. For example, in East Timor, the UN directly funded 
the hybrid tribunal’s prosecutor, whereas the impoverished East 
Timorese government funded the defense.179 As a result, during the 
first two years of trials in East Timor, no defense counsel called a 
single witness.180 More recently, the hybrid war crimes chamber in 
Bosnia has paid defense only for hours in the courtroom, offering no 
resources for investigation or pretrial work.181 Ultimately, the 
legitimacy of international criminal law depends on zealous defense. 
That in turn requires compensation for full and effective—but not 
dilatory—litigation and common budget constraints for the 
prosecutor and the defense. Although many American defense 
lawyers likewise suffer chronic funding problems, some enterprising 
lawyers have succeeded in increasing defense resources by reframing 
the debate. Domestic scholarship shows that phrasing the need for 
defense resources in terms of leveling the playing field, rather than 
helping defendants, can make proper funding more palatable.182 
 
 176. See id. ¶¶ 24–25. For the simplest cases, the lump sum payments assume 1,400 lead 
counsel hours; for the most difficult leadership cases, the lump sum payments assume 2,800 lead 
counsel hours. See id. Annex I. Defense counsel receive $132,000 for simple trials expected to 
take four months, or $400,000 for leadership trials expected to take ten months. See id. Annex 
III. 
 177. The UN notes: “If a trial stage terminates ahead of schedule, the defence will still be 
entitled to the full lump sum; conversely, if the trial runs a little longer, the defence will not 
receive additional payments.” Id. ¶ 25. 
 178. This structure encourages defense counsel to litigate quickly but not thoroughly. See 
generally Bibas, supra note 12, at 2476–78 (discussing how low lump sums or flat fees impair 
defense lawyering and encourage haste). 
 179. See Burke-White, supra note 4, at 70. 
 180. See id. 
 181. See Burke-White, supra note 62, at 346 n.255. 
 182. See, e.g., Ronald F. Wright, Parity of Resources for Defense Counsel and the Reach of 
Public Choice Theory, 90 IOWA L. REV. 219, 261–62 (2004). 
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IV.  IMPROVING INTERNATIONAL CASE MANAGEMENT 
Because international criminal justice has evolved so recently 
and haphazardly, it has only begun to heed to systemic issues of case 
management. The idealistic desire to do justice collides with the 
reality of limited time and money. The system must learn to perform 
better triage by screening out some cases and striking cooperation 
agreements or other plea bargains in many more. Otherwise, the 
hordes of lower-level cases will continue to delay or deny justice to 
the likes of Slobodan Milošević. We consider in turn how to improve 
gatekeeping and case selection, plea bargaining and caseloads, and 
finally sentencing. 
A. Gatekeeping and Case Selection 
Though the universe of potential cases is nearly infinite, 
international criminal tribunals can bring only a very few cases 
themselves. But they find it hard to motivate domestic prosecutors to 
pursue other cases, and critics often attack their decisions to take or 
decline certain cases.183 Although statutes emphasize the need to 
prosecute those most responsible, they lack clear criteria for ranking 
cases.184 The lack of criteria not only calls into question particular 
charging decisions but also delays important cases such as Milošević’s. 
 
 183. See William A. Schabas, Prosecutorial Discretion vs. Judicial Activism at the 
International Criminal Court, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 731, 736–48 (2008) (discussing criticisms of 
ICC case selection). In its early years, the ICTY pursued low-level suspects, id. at 746, when it 
desperately needed to bring any accused to fill empty courts. Unfortunately, the more recent 
reliance on subsidiarity and culpability for gatekeeping has not been fully effective. The ICTY 
still has pending indictments against twenty-five suspects and the ICC has at times failed to 
follow its statutory limitation to the most serious offenders. Details of the remaining ICTY cases 
in trial or awaiting trial are available at http://www.icty.org/action/cases/4. With a few 
exceptions, such as Radovan Karadžić, most of these suspects probably would not qualify as 
those most responsible for the atrocities in the Balkans. The first two indictees from the DRC 
are far from those most responsible for international crimes there. See Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, 
ICC-01/04-02/06, Warrant of Arrest, 3–4 (Aug. 22, 2006); Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-
1/06, Warrant of Arrest, 3–4 (Feb. 10, 2006). 
 184. The Rome Statute provides that a case must be “of sufficient gravity to justify further 
action by the Court.” Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 5, art. 
17(1)(d). The Prosecutor has sought to clarify in a white paper the criteria for selecting cases, 
but the paper has not been published and offers insufficient guidelines. See Office of the 
Prosecutor, supra note 67. Recent scholarship has sought to develop the gravity criterion. See 
Kevin Jon Heller, Situational Gravity Under the Rome Statute, in FUTURE DIRECTIONS IN 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Carsten Stahn & Larissa van den Herik eds., forthcoming 
January 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1270369. 
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To solve these problems, the first step is to clarify the functions 
and purposes of punishment. Part I.A discussed the need to target 
atrocities and serve as a backstop to domestic judiciaries, and Part I.B 
emphasized the goals of restoration, reconciliation, and retribution. 
This Part addresses how to implement these priorities in practice and 
draw on domestic lessons in doing so. 
Domestic prosecutors have plenty of experience with screening 
and gatekeeping. In particular, federal prosecutors choose to take 
certain cases federally and leave most others for the states. For 
example, many federal prosecutors’ offices have written declination 
guidelines. Typically, these guidelines classify cases by crime type, 
amount of money or drugs involved, criminal history, pattern of 
crime, strength of proof, and alternatives to federal prosecution.185 
Some district attorneys’ offices assign seasoned prosecutors to a 
specialized screening unit, which reviews and investigates incoming 
cases and decides whether the case is serious enough and whether the 
evidence is strong enough to justify the charges.186 Federal and state 
law-enforcement agencies often work together on joint task forces, 
pooling their resources and knowledge and directing cases to 
appropriate courts.187 
To apply these lessons internationally, one must first 
acknowledge resource constraints openly.188 A system that 
idealistically promises justice to everyone will disappoint most of 
them. It must focus on the most intentional and flagrant crimes that 
caused the gravest harm to the most victims and sowed the most 
widespread grief and bitterness.189 Coherent screening policies can 
pick a handful of strong cases involving the worst crimes, to maximize 
 
 185. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 77, at 29. 
 186. Wright & Miller, supra note 12, at 61–64 (discussing the New Orleans District 
Attorney’s office). 
 187. See, e.g., Sandra Guerra, The Myth of Dual Sovereignty: Multijurisdictional Drug Law 
Enforcement and Double Jeopardy, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1159, 1182–83 (1995) (describing the DEA’s 
creation and funding of federal task forces incorporating state and local police). 
 188. In 2006, the ICC Prosecutor indicated a goal of opening four to six investigations by 
2009. Michel De Smedt, Office of the Prosecutor, ICC, Statement at the Second Public Hearing 
of the Office of the Prosecutor: Outlining the Prosecutorial Strategy (Sept. 25, 2006), available 
at http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Structure+of+the+Court/Office+of+the+Prosecutor/ 
Network+with+Partners/Public+Hearings/Second+Public+Hearing/Session+1/Outlining+the+Pr
osecutorial+Strategy+_+Mr_+Michel+De+Smedt.htm. Only four investigations are presently 
underway. ICC, Situations and Cases: All Situations, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/ 
Situations+and+Cases/Situations/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2009). 
 189. For a discussion of international criminal justice’s primary function of targeting 
atrocities, see supra Part I.A. 
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public satisfaction and historic resolution. They can screen out all but 
the most serious international crimes and all but the highest-level 
persons responsible, such as political or military leaders. These 
criteria mesh with the backstop function of international law: national 
leaders can prosecute their own lower-level criminals but may be 
unable or unwilling to prosecute their own political and military 
leaders. 
The existence, efficacy, and limitations of national courts are 
important considerations here. Domestic federal prosecutions, for 
example, target deficiencies in state criminal justice. For example, the 
Petite Policy authorizes federal reprosecution if some flaw tainted an 
earlier state prosecution.190 Federal prosecutors may particularly 
intervene in cases of public corruption, excessive force, and civil-
rights violations by police, for which local prosecutors and courts are 
unlikely to clean house.191 
The backstop role means that international prosecutors must 
assess the willingness and ability of domestic prosecutors and courts 
to proceed. The ICC’s Rome Statute forbids international 
prosecution if there is a “genuine domestic prosecution.”192 As a 
result, prosecutors must gauge whether a domestic regime is 
sheltering war criminals, dragging its feet in prosecuting them, or 
pursuing them with vigor. More active domestic prosecutions can 
 
 190. 3 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL § 9-2.031 (2d ed. Supp. 2009) 
(allowing evidence that corruption, incompetence, intimidation, or undue influence tainted a 
prior state prosecution to overcome the presumption against federal reprosecution). Of course, 
double jeopardy is not a constitutional bar to reprosecution by a different sovereign, Bartkus v. 
Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 132 (1959), but as a policy matter the Department of Justice steps in only 
when state proceedings were deficient or inadequate. 
 191. For example, U.S. Attorney Patrick Fitzgerald succeeded remarkably in indicting two 
sitting Illinois governors within five years. Fitzgerald was chosen precisely because, as an 
outsider, he would be freer to clean up state and local corruption. See John Kass, U.S. Attorney’s 
Independence Pays Dividends, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 21, 2003, at C2 (“I think that having an 
independent U.S. attorney out of reach of the normal power brokers who run Illinois is a major 
and important change in our state.” (quoting Ill. Sen. Peter Fitzgerald (no relation), who 
appointed Fitzgerald)). A different example is the Department of Justice’s reprosecution of 
Rodney King’s attackers, four white Los Angeles police officers who had the venue of their 
local trial changed to a mostly white suburb and were acquitted despite damning film capturing 
their extended beating of King. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 85–88 (1996); Robert 
Reinhold, U.S. Jury Indicts 4 Police Officers in King Beating, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1992, at A1. 
 192. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 5, art. 17(1)(a); see 
also John T. Holmes, Complementarity: National Courts Versus the ICC, in 1 THE ROME 
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY, supra note 65, at 667, 
667 (“Ironically, however, the provisions of the Rome Statute itself contemplate an institution 
that may never be employed.”). 
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relieve the international caseload. International prosecutors and 
courts should spur domestic enforcement, through what one of us has 
dubbed proactive complementarity.193 Thus, if the ICC’s Prosecutor 
can prod national courts to prosecute, he is barred from doing so, but 
has achieved his ultimate goal of exposing and punishing atrocities.194 
In other words, international encouragement and prodding can 
leverage scarce international resources, producing hundreds or 
thousands of domestic prosecutions in lieu of dozens of international 
ones. 
When domestic courts are willing and able to prosecute, the ICC 
has little need to proceed. When domestic prosecutors or courts are 
unwilling or reluctant, international courts can spur them to act. For 
example, they can shame national courts into action by focusing 
media attention on a case. They can begin their own investigations or 
send letters informing national governments that, if national courts 
remain passive, they intend to prosecute internationally.195 Many 
nations want to be perceived well and fear the embarrassment and 
intrusion upon sovereignty of having an international court intervene. 
Those nations may find it less politically costly to prosecute the 
wrongdoers themselves. 
When domestic prosecutors and courts are willing but not fully 
capable, international courts can help to develop their capacity. 
Although international courts are not designed to build domestic 
judiciaries, they sit at the center of transnational networks and can 
bring publicity, diplomacy, and investigative resources to bear.196 
Other organizations, such as the European Union, can help to build 
and strengthen domestic judiciaries so that they can hear atrocity 
cases.197 A more direct way to assist weak domestic courts would be to 
 
 193. See Burke-White, supra note 9, at 53–64 (developing the concept of proactive 
complementarity). 
 194. See Moreno-Ocampo, supra note 84, at 2 (“As a consequence of complementarity, the 
number of cases that reach the Court should not be a measure of its efficiency. On the contrary, 
the absence of trials before this Court, as a consequence of the regular functioning of national 
institutions, would be a major success.”). 
 195. The ICC Prosecutor followed this approach by writing to the government of Colombia 
seeking information on the lack of domestic prosecutions. See Burke-White, supra note 9, at 89–
90. 
 196. See id. at 95–96; Turner, supra note 7, at 1007. 
 197. The European Union has provided significant funding and resources to DRC courts 
after the initiation of the ICC investigation in 2004. See William W. Burke-White, 
Complementarity in Practice: The International Criminal Court as Part of a System of Multi-
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use their greater resources to investigate and prepare cases at the 
international level and then hand off prepared dossiers to domestic 
prosecutors for prosecution.198 
Another possible way to shrink the international docket is to 
apply the referral back mechanism more broadly. Having found itself 
overburdened, the ICTY has referred many lower-level cases in 
which it had already issued indictments back to national courts for 
domestic prosecution.199 If the domestic judiciaries do not prosecute 
these cases to the satisfaction of the international prosecutor, 
however, the ICTY reserves the right to recall the cases to the 
international level.200 The ICC does something similar, abstaining 
from international prosecution when there is a genuine national 
prosecution.201 International courts could use this referral back 
mechanism not only reactively to reduce unforeseen backlogs, but 
proactively to cooperate with, stimulate, and guide domestic 
judiciaries. They could plan to farm out certain classes of cases to 
willing, competent courts in affected or other nations and retain 
oversight and checks to make sure these prosecutions were genuine.202 
International double jeopardy law resembles domestic policy, which 
allows reprosecution of state cases tainted by “incompetence, 
corruption, intimidation, or undue influence . . . [or] court or jury 
nullification in clear disregard of the evidence or the law.”203 But so 
long as the domestic prosecution is genuine, the international court 
will not intervene. International referrals could help guide domestic 
 
Level Global Governance in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 18 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 557, 571 
n.76 (2005). 
 198. This proposal would institutionalize an aspect of the ICTY’s referral back mechanism 
under rule 11bis whereby cases were handed back to national prosecutors in Bosnia. See ICTY 
R. P. & EVID. 11bis. The ICTY sent back prepared dossiers to national prosecutors to facilitate 
domestic prosecutions. See Burke-White, supra note 62, at 340–41. To make this practice work, 
one would need to amend the Rome Statute’s rules regarding confidentiality of information, 
and defense lawyers might need assistance to ensure equality of arms. 
 199. See Burke-White, supra note 62, at 321–28. 
 200. See ICTY R. P. & EVID. 11bis(f) (providing for recall of cases). 
 201. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 5, art. 17. 
 202. As this Article has discussed, see supra note 192 and accompanying text, international 
courts are generally barred from investigating if the territorial court is willing and able to 
prosecute domestically. Sometimes, however, a formerly unwilling nation becomes willing to 
prosecute after a new government comes into power, in which case an international court could 
then refer some cases back for domestic prosecution. 
 203. 3 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL, supra note 190, § 9-2.031(D). 
Compare id. (setting forth criteria for reprosecution quoted above), with Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, supra note 5, art. 20 (barring reprosecution where domestic 
prosecution was genuine). 
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prosecutorial strategy and fill the impunity gap of lower-level cases 
that international tribunals cannot prosecute. The threat of revoking 
international referrals can help to keep domestic prosecutions on 
track and leverage limited international resources. Overall, managing 
cases well, especially by ranking priorities and allocating cases to 
different courts, can make the international justice system more 
effective for more cases. 
B. Plea Bargaining and Caseloads 
Another important conflict between idealism and realism is in 
the field of plea bargaining. Ideally, international courts would hold 
full public trials of all grave atrocities, or at least whenever national 
courts cannot or will not do so. But the number of blood-stained 
killers far exceeds the number of international trial slots. Often, 
domestic courts are not an option, as many cases arise out of failed or 
complicit states. Thus, international and hybrid courts face hard 
choices: Do they try to offer perfect justice for everyone with 
elaborate due process and crawl at a snail’s pace, as the ICTY did 
with Milošević? Do they take at best a dozen cases a year and leave 
thousands of others unpunished? Or do they dirty their hands, 
haggling over the price of murder and trading off public vindication 
for lesser punishment and quick plea bargains? 
International courts have unthinkingly chosen the first of these 
options—the impossible quest for perfect, widespread justice. The 
average ICTR and ICTY trial spans almost a year and a half, costs 
millions, hears hundreds of witnesses, and fills more than ten 
thousand transcript pages.204 These trials have grown far more bloated 
than their equivalents at Nuremberg. But, as the Milošević example 
shows, the best is the enemy of the good. Because the ICTY tried too 
hard to dispense retail justice to everyone, it failed to dispense justice 
to perhaps the most culpable man of all. 
The second choice would be more defensible. By even more 
rigorously screening out all but a handful of top defendants, 
international prosecutors could at least set part of the historical 
record straight, offer some healing, and inflict public retribution on 
warlords and dictators. One could combine this approach with 
streamlined pretrial and trial procedures, so international courts 
 
 204. NANCY AMOURY COMBS, GUILTY PLEAS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: 
CONSTRUCTING A RESTORATIVE JUSTICE APPROACH 28 (2007). 
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could try one or two dozen defendants a year. On this approach, 
though, international courts would have little credible leverage to 
prod reluctant domestic courts into action. 
Also, to reach the head of a criminal organization, domestic 
prosecutors normally must start at the bottom and work up. They 
start with drug pushers whom eyewitnesses saw peddling heroin, use 
threats of punishments and promises of leniency to get them to testify 
against their suppliers, and work up the chain to drug lords. In other 
words, at least some plea bargaining with smaller fry is essential to 
shatter the conspiracy of silence that surrounds the big fish, the ones 
who most deserve punishment. International prosecutors could use 
the same approach to prosecute otherwise insulated defendants, by 
beginning cases with soldiers and working up the chain of command 
to generals and warlords.205 Though international prosecutors must 
focus on prosecuting those most responsible, charging and bargaining 
away lower-level cases may facilitate prosecuting those higher up.206 
Moreover, as Nancy Combs argues, prosecution of violent crime 
is the traditional norm in domestic law, and plea bargaining is a more 
lenient innovation. International atrocities, in contrast, traditionally 
went unpunished; even today, international courts can try only a tiny 
handful.207 One alternative, a truth and reconciliation commission 
such as South Africa’s, gives complete immunity in exchange for 
airing the truth. Given those alternatives, plea bargaining looks less 
like lenient innovation than improved accountability. If only a 
handful of defendants are tried and punished, they may appear to be 
 
 205. International prosecutors do occasionally bargain for information and cooperation, 
though neither systematically nor effectively. See id. at 108–10 (describing two botched efforts 
to procure the cooperation of ICTR defendants: in one case, the defendant disappeared and was 
found dead after references to his cooperation became public, while in the other case, Rwanda 
blocked a proposed effort to move the cooperating defendant’s trial to Norway, where the 
sentence would likely be lighter); Trial Watch: Michel Bagaragaza, http://www.trial-ch.org/ 
en/trial-watch/profile/db/legal-procedures/michel_bagaragaza_378.html (last visited Nov. 8, 
2009) (reporting that after efforts to transfer the trial to Norway and the Netherlands failed, a 
cooperating defendant was transferred back to Tanzania and entered a confidential plea 
agreement). 
 206. If international and domestic systems were integrated enough, international authorities 
could prod domestic ones to investigate and prosecute lower-level defendants to generate 
evidence for eventual international prosecutions. The closest parallel to this approach is the 
cooperation between U.S. state and federal law-enforcement agencies, in which task forces 
cooperate to develop evidence and prosecute in either venue. See, e.g., JAN CHAIKEN ET AL., 
NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, MULTIJURISDICTIONAL DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES: 
REDUCING SUPPLY AND DEMAND 43–47 (1990) (discussing case studies of cooperative efforts 
between state and federal law enforcement). 
 207. COMBS, supra note 204, at 129–32. 
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tokens, scapegoats, martyrs, or fall guys. Broadening the net of 
conviction and retribution would share blame, substitute for private 
vengeance, and elicit more complete historical narratives.208 Done 
correctly, more frequent plea bargaining can both restore war-torn 
communities by airing painful truths and inflict a measure of 
retribution on many more defendants. 
For years, international courts piously proclaimed that they 
would never trade leniency, not even in exchange for much-needed 
cooperation.209 But they then lurched in the other direction. Prodded 
by staggering backlogs, international courts have begun to plea 
bargain more in the last few years, drawing criticism from European 
scholars.210 Unfortunately, they have not always gone about it in the 
right way. As Ronald Wright and Marc Miller argue, trials are most 
honest and transparent, followed by open guilty pleas without 
bargains. But if one must bargain, the best plea bargains are sentence 
bargains, which offer sentence discounts without distorting the facts 
or the charges. Charge bargains are much worse, because lowering 
the charges often distorts the historical record and lies to the public 
about what actually happened. Fact bargains likewise conceal or 
blatantly lie about what happened.211 Charge and fact bargains are 
even more troubling in the international arena because they undercut 
restoration and setting the historical record straight. Yet international 
courts have quickly succumbed to charge bargains, many of which 
appear to suppress, distort, or misrepresent the historical record. For 
example, ICTY prosecutors dropped a charge that Milan Simić had 
discriminatorily persecuted thousands of Bosnian civilians in 
exchange for his pleading guilty to torturing five victims, even though 
Simić refused to cooperate against other defendants.212 It would be far 
 
 208. Id. at 46–47, 53–55. 
 209. See id. at 60 (citing the declaration of a former ICTY president that “no one should be 
immune from prosecution for [certain crimes], no matter how useful their testimony may 
otherwise be”). 
 210. See, e.g., Michael P. Scharf, supra note 8, at 1074–80 (considering the tradeoffs in plea 
bargaining); Alan Tieger & Milbert Shin, Plea Agreements in the ICTY: Purpose, Effects and 
Propriety, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 666, 669–79 (2005) (criticizing aspects of ICTY plea 
bargaining). 
 211. Wright & Miller, supra note 12, at 111. 
 212. In 2002, the ICTY began charge bargaining in the Simić case. COMBS, supra note 204, 
at 63–65. Several later ICTY cases contain troubling indications of charge bargaining, though it 
is often difficult to be sure why a prosecutor dropped particular charges. Id. at 67–70. Likewise, 
ICTY prosecutors have begun to bargain more aggressively over whether particular defendants 
committed genocide or lesser crimes. Id. at 111–12. 
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better to bring bargaining out into the open, explicitly authorizing 
sentence bargaining and clamping down on charge and fact 
bargaining. For example, international tribunals should delete 
provisions that allow prosecutors to strike bargains agreeing to 
amend indictments, and at guilty-plea colloquies should insist on 
proof of guilt independent of the parties’ collusive agreement.213 
Not all cases are appropriate for plea bargaining. The most 
important international defendants are the ringleaders—the top 
political and military officials who orchestrated atrocities. It is far 
more important to try and punish the likes of Adolf Hitler, Hermann 
Goering, Idi Amin, Pol Pot, Slobodan Milošević, and Radovan 
Karadžić than their low- and mid-level minions. Plea bargaining with 
low- and mid-level killers clears dockets and procures testimony so 
that the system can punish and set the record straight more 
effectively, especially at the top. Thus, international courts should ban 
plea bargaining and insist on open trials for the very top leaders, the 
ones at the center of the historical record and blame. 
If guilty pleas are to substitute for trials’ truth-telling function in 
some cases, they must also include full, detailed plea allocutions. 
Victims who wish to do so must be able to see and hear their 
tormenters confess unequivocally, without denial, excuse, 
minimization, or blaming victims. Unequivocal, detailed confessions 
would thwart future atrocity deniers and propagandists. Sentence 
discounts should not be automatic for perfunctory, bare-bones 
admissions of guilt, as happens all too often in domestic American 
guilty pleas.214 
Another useful approach is to join guilty pleas to restorative 
justice. Restorative justice is an umbrella term for structured 
opportunities for wrongdoers, victims, mediators, and often friends 
and relatives to talk with and listen to one another. Many victims 
want not only retribution, but also information, reparation, and, when 
possible, apologies. They value opportunities to tell their stories, 
 
 213. See ICTY R. P. & EVID. 62bis(iv) (allowing an agreement between parties to be a 
sufficient factual basis for a guilty plea); id. 62ter(A)(i) (allowing prosecutors to agree to amend 
indictments as part of plea bargains). 
 214. See Michael M. O’Hear, Remorse, Cooperation, and “Acceptance of Responsibility”: 
The Structure, Implementation, and Reform of Section 3E1.1 of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1507, 1534–40 (1997) (reporting the results of an empirical study 
of one federal district in which acceptance-of-responsibility reduction operated as a nearly 
automatic plea discount in practice and reviewing national evidence that 88 percent of 
defendants who plead guilty, but only 20 percent of those who go to trial, receive the discount). 
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express their feelings, and perhaps forgive and release their 
resentment, anger, and grief. Involvement empowers victims and 
takes their needs and views seriously. Restorative justice efforts can 
tap into a local society’s traditions and culture, helping to bring justice 
home for victims.215 Many wrongdoers bear the weight of guilt and 
shame and want to cleanse themselves or perhaps even ask for 
forgiveness. Granted, other victims and defendants are reluctant to 
take part, and confessions and apologies can be absent, halting, or 
insincere. But when the parties are willing, this kind of storytelling 
gives everyone access to a form of justice and increases satisfaction, as 
South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission shows. 
Restorative justice is not a substitute for retribution for atrocities, but 
it may supplement guilty pleas when the parties are willing.216 
In sum, increasing the use of plea bargaining, managing cases 
better, and offering restorative justice can shrink dockets, increase 
accountability, and make the remaining international trials more 
effective. 
C. Sentencing 
Sentencing and plea-bargaining rules must work in tandem. To 
encourage guilty pleas, there must be incentives to plead guilty, to 
participate in restorative justice, and to testify and provide 
information against other defendants. Instead of charge reductions, 
prosecutors need to be able to offer explicit sentence discounts. True, 
this proposal commodifies justice and apologies, which in an ideal 
world would be priceless.217 But we do not live in an ideal world, and 
we desperately need truth and justice to halt the cycle of vengeance in 
war-torn lands. As one of us has argued, even a purchased, insincere 
apology is valuable: it vindicates the victim, humbles the wrongdoer, 
 
 215. Restorative justice is a nascent, growing movement in countries including Australia, 
New Zealand, and Canada, as well as various American states. For a survey of the field, see 
generally Symposium, The Utah Restorative Justice Conference, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 1. The 
proposed peace settlement in Uganda seeks to harness this approach; it would try the senior 
rebels domestically and have them participate in restorative justice processes as well. See 
Annexure to Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation, Lord’s Resistance 
Army/Movement-Uganda, Feb. 19, 2008, available at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/ 
Annexure_to_agreement_on_Accountability_signed_today.pdf. 
 216. For an extended argument for integrating restorative justice into international plea 
bargaining, see COMBS, supra note 204, at 136–87. 
 217. For a powerful statement of this position in the context of civil lawsuits, see Lee Taft, 
Apology Subverted: The Commodification of Apology, 109 YALE L.J. 1135, 1156–57 (2000). 
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affirms the violated norm, and may even induce repentance by 
cracking the wrongdoer’s denials and excuses.218 
Probably the least offensive way to encourage guilty pleas is to 
offer relatively fixed sentence discounts in exchange for complete, 
truthful pleas. Sentencing rules could prescribe these discounts 
automatically in exchange for open guilty pleas, without any need for 
bargaining. Alternatively, prosecutors could recommend sentence 
discounts according to a fixed schedule, provided that judges followed 
a settled practice of usually heeding prosecutors’ recommendations. 
A guilty plea with a full, truthful allocution could earn a one-fifth 
discount, for example.219 A guilty plea coupled with full participation 
in restorative justice might earn a one-third discount.220 And a guilty 
plea coupled with restorative justice and full cooperation with the 
authorities against other defendants might earn a one-half discount.221 
(If courts need more leverage to encourage the fullest cooperation, 
discounts could range from one-third to one-half depending on the 
degree of cooperation.) This approach would avoid the dishonesty 
inherent in charge and fact bargains and would minimize unseemly, 
unequal haggling dependent on the quality of one’s lawyer. Fixed 
discounts can be difficult to enforce domestically, where prosecutors 
have a wealth of different charges and sentencing factors that they 
 
 218. Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology into 
Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85, 143–44 (2004). 
 219. See Bibas, supra note 12, at 2538 & n.331 (collecting commentators advocating fixed 
plea discounts of between 10 percent and 20 percent, as well as literature suggesting that 
defendants’ high discount rates would require discounts toward the upper end of this range for 
sentences of ten years or more). 
 220. Cf. CODICE DI PROCEDURA PENALE arts. 442, 444.1 (Italy) (providing for a one-third 
sentence reduction for a guilty plea to a minor charge provided the reduced sentence does not 
exceed five years, and a one-third sentence reduction for agreeing to an abbreviated trial of 
certain serious charges); Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key 
Compromises upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 28 (1988) (discussing the 
Sentencing Commission’s empirical data that, before the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines were 
created, guilty pleas typically received sentence discounts of 30 percent to 40 percent); Julie R. 
O’Sullivan, In Defense of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines’ Modified Real-Offense System, 91 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1342, 1415 (1997) (reporting that under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, guilty pleas 
typically earn acceptance-of-responsibility discounts of about 35 percent). 
 221. Cf. LINDA DRAZGA MAXFIELD & JOHN H. KRAMER, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 
SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE: AN EMPIRICAL YARDSTICK GAUGING EQUITY IN CURRENT 
FEDERAL POLICY AND PRACTICE 33 ex. 12 (1998) (reporting that average sentence reductions 
for defendants belonging to certain demographic groups who successfully cooperated with 
federal authorities ranged between 54 percent and 66 percent below the otherwise applicable 
Sentencing Guidelines minimum). 
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can manipulate.222 But the problem should be more manageable 
internationally, as the range of possible charges is far narrower and 
the widely publicized facts are harder to hide or distort. 
International courts also need to integrate their cooperation 
rewards with domestic systems. Because the same defendant can face 
charges or have information relevant to international, hybrid, and 
domestic trials, one level of court may need to grant leniency in 
exchange for cooperation at another level. For example, domestic 
courts could offer soldiers plea discounts in exchange for their 
testifying against their commanding officers in international trials. In 
these cases, courts need mechanisms to delay sentencing until other 
defendants’ proceedings end or to reopen sentencing if a need for 
cooperation arises later. Also, cooperating witnesses may refuse to 
make incriminating statements unless they receive use or derivative-
use immunity against having those statements introduced into 
evidence against them domestically or internationally. International 
and national courts may need to harmonize their immunity 
guarantees to encourage cooperators to disclose the whole truth.223 
Although there are no international sentencing guidelines, there 
have been some efforts to move toward common sentencing 
practices.224 Should each international tribunal try to equalize its 
sentences with those imposed by other international tribunals, or 
rather with domestic sentences in the country where the crime was 
committed? Sentences vary widely, particularly between Africa 
(where many international crimes occur) and Western Europe (whose 
nations often take leadership roles in international courts), so the 
choice of law matters.225 In the American federal system, it makes 
sense to harmonize federal sentences horizontally for crimes 
prosecuted almost exclusively at the federal level, such as 
immigration, counterfeiting, and federal income tax evasion.226 
Federal laws, policies, and interests are written to apply uniformly 
 
 222. See Bibas, supra note 12, at 2535–37. 
 223. The ICC could integrate this harmonization into the existing cooperation agreements 
the court signs with many States Parties. 
 224. E.g., Daniel B. Pickard, Proposed Sentencing Guidelines for the International Criminal 
Court, 20 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 123, 127–28 (1997). 
 225. Cf. JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE 
WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE (2003) (discussing how criminal justice is 
milder in Europe than it is in the United States). 
 226. See Stephanos Bibas, Regulating Local Variations in Federal Sentencing, 58 STAN. L. 
REV. 137, 140 (2005). 
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across a single legal system. But for crimes that either level can 
prosecute, such as robberies and gun cases, there is more need to 
harmonize sentences vertically, so the fortuity of federalizing some 
cases does not change sentences much.227 
If international law focused on transnational crimes, such as 
piracy, the case for horizontal uniformity would be strong. Because 
international law instead targets atrocities and serves as a backstop, 
international prosecutions necessarily overlap with domestic ones. 
Domestic courts often try cases that could be handled internationally. 
In the ICTY, for example, Bosnian courts receive cases back from 
international tribunals but ultimately apply their own domestic 
sentencing rules.228 Similar issues relating to vertical uniformity arise 
when domestic courts prosecute atrocities under domestic law. The 
lines between genocide and mass murder or between systematic rape 
and serial rape are at least fuzzy, and domestic crimes are lesser 
included offenses of international ones. Thus, it is more important for 
international sentences to track domestic ones in the territorial state 
(at least roughly) than to track the sentences of other international 
tribunals. 
International tribunals appear to be moving away from vertical 
sentencing harmonization, in part because Western Europeans favor 
lighter sentences and oppose the death penalty, which remains on the 
books in many countries where international crimes occur.229 Though 
the ICTY Statute called on the Tribunal to take into consideration 
domestic sentencing rules in the former Yugoslavia, the Rome Statute 
does not require the ICC to give similar consideration to national 
sentencing practices in the territorial state.230 To foster vertical 
 
 227. See Daniel Richman, Federal Sentencing in 2007: The Supreme Court Holds—The 
Center Doesn’t, 117 YALE L.J. 1374, 1402–06 (2008). 
 228. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Stanković, Case No. X-KRŽ-05/70, slip op. at 13–15 (Court of 
Bosnia & Herzegovina, Section I, War Crimes Chamber, Mar. 28, 2007), available at 
http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/files/docs/presude/2007/Radovan_Stankovic_-_Final_Verdict_-_ENG. 
pdf (lengthening prison terms and applying domestic legal rules). 
 229. See generally WHITMAN, supra note 225 (comparing the harshness of criminal 
sentences in the United States and European countries). Vertical uniformity was problematic in 
Cambodia, where disagreement over the availability of the death penalty stalled the 
establishment of the tribunal. For the resolution by the Constitutional Council, see 
Constitutional Council, Case No. 038/001/2001, Decision No. 040/002/2001 (Feb. 12, 2001). 
 230. Compare Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 
of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993)I, Annex, Art. 24(1), U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993) 
(“In determining the terms of imprisonment, the Trial Chambers shall have recourse to the 
general practice regarding prison sentences in the courts of the former Yugoslavia.”), and ICTY 
R. P. & EVID. 101(b)(iii) (same), with Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra 
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sentencing harmonization, the ICC could consider domestic practice 
in the territorial state as an explicit element at sentencing. The result 
would likely be longer sentences for most convicts but greater 
harmonization with domestic practice. 
Finally, there remains the issue of whether to codify sentencing 
rules in structured guidelines or to leave them as open, unstructured 
ranges. Traditional, unstructured sentencing lets judges sentence 
murderers to probation, life imprisonment, or anywhere in between. 
Structured sentencing sets a much narrower range based on factors 
such as the defendant’s criminal history and role in the crime, the 
severity of the crime, and the number of victims. If they seek vertical 
uniformity, international tribunals cannot use rules radically different 
from those in place in the territorial state of the crime. Nevertheless, 
even when tracking nations that have vague sentencing factors, 
international courts can at least clarify and weigh the factors openly. 
Sentencing rules of thumb or true guidelines can improve the 
predictability and equality of sentences and reduce defendants’ 
optimism about their likely sentences after trial, thereby promoting 
guilty pleas and cooperation.231 Thus, sentencing guidelines should 
make sentencing practices clearer and more predictable, specify plea-
bargaining and cooperation discounts, and harmonize international 
sentences with those imposed in territorial domestic courts. 
V.  PRETRIAL AND TRIAL PROCEDURES 
The new international criminal justice system comprises 
elements from many nations’ systems, both adversarial and 
inquisitorial. In this Part, we first make a broader point: either 
adversarial or inquisitorial procedures can be effective, but each 
system requires certain checks that the other system often lacks. 
Unfortunately, in synthesizing the two systems, international courts 
have often lost sight of cautionary domestic experiences with the two 
types of systems. Then, we go on to apply domestic lessons to several 
areas of pretrial and trial procedure. Discovery rules should focus less 
on prosecutorial awareness and wrongdoing and more on whether 
evidence may cast doubt on guilt. At the same time, discovery of 
inculpatory evidence needs to be coupled with safeguards to prevent 
witness tampering. Trial procedures need to ensure speedier trials 
 
note 5, art. 78 (providing guidelines for the “[d]etermination of the sentence” but failing to refer 
to not including reference to domestic law). 
 231. Bibas, supra note 12, at 2533. 
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and guarantee either neutral magistrates or adversarial cross-
examination to test hearsay. Finally, to heal victims’ emotional and 
psychic wounds, international criminal justice needs stronger and 
better-enforced victims’ rights. 
A. Melding Adversarial and Inquisitorial Process 
International criminal tribunals have developed a unique 
procedural system that melds inquisitorial and adversarial 
processes.232 Nuremberg, and later the ICTY and ICTR, began as 
primarily adversarial systems.233 Although the ICTY’s largely 
adversarial system went far to ensure defendant rights, it also resulted 
in long trials with hundreds of witnesses and unacceptable delays.234 
To expedite trials, the ICTY undertook a series of reforms that 
moved further toward inquisitorial justice.235 The result is a hybrid 
international criminal procedure.236 
 
 232. See Diane Marie Amann, Harmonic Convergence? Constitutional Criminal Procedure 
in an International Context, 75 IND. L.J. 809, 842 (2000) (“Like the London Charter, the 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda tribunals’ statutes and rules combine aspects of the common law, civil 
law, and military law.”); Gregory S. Gordon, Toward an International Criminal Procedure: Due 
Process Aspirations and Limitations, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 635, 640 (2007) (noting that 
international tribunals “are forced to compromise internally regarding procedural 
matters . . . [and] must harmonize the imperatives of . . . the common law and the civil law”). 
 233. Gordon, supra note 232, at 644 (noting some inquisitorial elements at Nuremberg, 
including the use of affidavit testimony); Langer, supra note 8, at 857 (“Those judges drafted 
[the ICTY and ICTR] Rules with a clear adversarial inclination.”); Evan J. Wallach, The 
Procedural and Evidentiary Rules of the Post-World War II War Crimes Trials: Did They 
Provide an Outline for International Legal Procedure?, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 851, 854 
(1999). 
 234. Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, President, ICTY, Report of the International Tribunal for the 
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
Committee in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, ¶ 13, delivered to the Security 
Council and the General Assembly, U.N. Doc S/1999/846, A/54/187 (Aug. 25, 1999) (“The 
Tribunal’s Judges are concerned about the length of time many of the trials and other 
proceedings are taking . . . .”). 
 235. See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 369 (2003) (“[T]o expedite 
proceedings which, being grounded in the adversarial model, were rather lengthy, it was 
necessary to depart from the common law scheme . . . . whereby the court has no knowledge of 
the case before commencement of trial.”); Langer, supra note 8, at 869–874; Jorda, supra note 
67, at 1. 
 236. Wallach, supra note 233, at 854. Langer calls this “managerial judging.” See generally 
Langer, supra note 8 (discussing the rise of managerial judging at the ICTY). The new ICC rules 
of procedure and evidence are based largely on this model. See Nancy Amoury Combs, 
International Criminal Jurisprudence Comes of Age: The Substance and Procedure of an 
Emerging Discipline, 42 HARV. INT’L L.J. 555, 566 (2001) (reviewing SUBSTANTIVE AND 
PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: THE EXPERIENCE OF 
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Fundamentally, adversarial and inquisitorial systems specify very 
different roles for judges, prosecutors, and even defendants. 
Adversarial judges are detached umpires, with prosecutors and 
defense counsel serving as zealous investigators and advocates for 
their clients. In contrast, inquisitorial judges and investigating 
magistrates are active truth-seekers, collecting and reviewing 
evidence to determine facts.237 
Our argument is not that a pure adversarial or inquisitorial 
system is preferable. Our fear is that the mishmash of the two systems 
has abandoned some distinctive checks on which each system 
depends. The lack of appropriate mental models for the role of 
judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel results in confusion and 
perhaps even systemic failure. For example, when an American 
defense attorney dared to object repeatedly to the ICTY Prosecutor’s 
evidence, the judges found his adversarial advocacy inappropriate 
and rejected his procedural objections. The French presiding judge 
criticized him for trying to import “the procedures that Mr. Hayman 
is used to using in Los Angeles.”238 If the system is going to be 
adversarial, American experience suggests, it needs to allow zealous 
adversarial testing of the evidence instead of censuring American 
lawyers for playing their roles. If, however, the system is going to be 
inquisitorial at root, it needs to retain more inquisitorial safeguards. 
Additionally, the mishmash of systems obscures how to allocate 
resources. Because an adversarial system is based on two relatively 
equal parties contesting facts and evidence, each side needs roughly 
equal, adequate resources in order to investigate. American 
experience teaches that in an adversarial system, parity of funding for 
the two sides is crucial.239 But when inquisitorial judges carry the 
 
INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL COURTS (Gabrielle Kirk McDonald & Olivia Swaak-
Goldman eds., 1990)). 
 237. See Langer, supra note 8, at 849–53; Vladimir Tochilovsky, Legal Systems and Cultures 
in the International Criminal Court: The Experience from the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia, in INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PROSECUTION OF CRIMES UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 627, 630 (Horst Fischer et al. eds., 2001) (discussing the different legal 
cultures in international criminal tribunals). Adversarial and inquisitorial systems are two poles 
along a spectrum. Today, most continental European judges and scholars describe their system 
as mixed rather than purely inquisitorial, in part because nineteenth- and twentieth-century 
reforms borrowed some safeguards from adversarial systems. David Alan Sklansky, Anti-
Inquisitorialism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1634, 1640 (2009). 
 238. See Kitty Felde, ‘L.A. Law’ at a War Tribunal: Clash of Legal Systems, Styles, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 3, 1997, at 7. 
 239. See, e.g., Wright, supra note 182; see also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-293(h) (2005) 
(mandating salary parity for prosecutors and public defenders); State v. Lynch, 796 P.2d 1150, 
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burden of investigating for both sides, the parties need fewer 
resources and the judges need more resources. 
B. Discovery 
The legacy of the adversarial system is that each opposing party 
investigates and presents evidence favorable to its own side, with no 
judicial oversight. One of the worst features of the adversary system, 
especially in America, is that it allows each party to prepare, shape, 
and even coach its own witnesses to elicit favorable facts and suppress 
unfavorable ones. Inquisitorial systems, in contrast, have judges and 
police who question witnesses. Though advocates may suggest certain 
witnesses or certain subjects for questioning, in an inquisitorial 
system, they may not speak directly with most witnesses.240 
In this respect, international criminal procedures combine the 
worst of both adversarial and inquisitorial worlds. They spell out no 
evidentiary, ethical, or procedural limitations on witness preparation, 
allowing partisan adversaries to distort the truth.241 At the same time, 
they provide for very broad discovery. Well ahead of trial, 
prosecutors must turn over prior statements of all witnesses the 
prosecutor plans to call at trial, and thereafter defense lawyers must 
make similar disclosures.242 Full pretrial discovery has many merits, 
eliminating trial by surprise and facilitating preparation. But in 
inquisitorial systems, judges and police interview witnesses well 
 
1161 (Okla. Crim. App. 1990) (using prosecutors’ salaries as a benchmark for setting defense 
lawyers’ salaries). 
 240. William T. Pizzi & Walter Perron, Crime Victims in German Courtrooms: A 
Comparative Perspective on American Problems, 32 STAN. J. INT’L L. 37, 42–44, 58–59 (1996) 
(reporting that Germany, like most civil law countries, strongly prefers uncoached narrative 
testimony, and views American-style witness preparation as unethical; instead, prosecutors and 
defense and victims’ lawyers suggest additional witnesses for police to interview, leaving the 
questioning of those witnesses to police and judges). 
 241. Witness preparation has been accepted by the ICTY and ICTR since their inception. 
See e.g., Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Decision on Defence Motion on Prosecution 
Practice of ‘Proofing’ Witnesses, at 2 (Dec. 10, 2004) (rejecting a challenge to the Prosecutor’s 
preparation of witnesses). The ICTR dismissed the possibility that witness preparation would 
distort the truth, noting: “There are clear standards of professional conduct which apply to 
Prosecuting counsel when proofing witnesses.” Id. at 3; see also Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case 
No. ICTR-98-44-AR73.8, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Regarding Witness Proofing, ¶ 14 
(May 11, 2007) (approving the use of witness preparation at the ICTR); Ruben Karemaker, B. 
Don Taylor & Thomas W. Pittman, Witness Proofing in International Criminal Tribunals: A 
Critical Analysis of Widening Procedural Divergence, 21 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 683, 685–86 (2008) 
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 242. ICC R. P. & EVID. 76.1; ICTY R. P. & EVID. 66(A)(ii). 
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before trial, and their transcripts are admissible into evidence.243 
Because neither witness tampering nor intimidation can erase the 
witness’s story, full discovery is much less dangerous. When one 
prosecutes genocidal warlords in an adversarial system, however, full 
discovery creates far too much temptation to kill or silence the 
complaining witnesses and to tailor one’s story to the evidence 
revealed in discovery. Full, open-file discovery in New Jersey has 
proved deadly to witnesses, tempting defendants’ associates to kill 
them to keep them from testifying.244 Discovery is desirable, but it 
must be coupled with inquisitorial measures to preserve and admit 
witness testimony, and to thwart witness tampering.245 The ICC has 
recently taken an important step in this direction, breaking with 
earlier international tribunals by forbidding witness preparation. 
Now, only the Victim and Witness Unit—not the Prosecutor—may 
familiarize witnesses with the proceedings and with past statements.246 
The fragmentation of authority poses another problem for 
discovery. Prosecutors must turn over to the defense evidence that 
could exculpate or mitigate the defendant’s crime or impeach the 
prosecution’s evidence. This duty extends only to information that the 
prosecutor actually knows about and possesses or controls.247 The 
fragmentation of investigative and enforcement authority across 
different states and international organizations, however, means that 
the prosecutor may not actually know about or control evidence in a 
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¶ 5 (limiting disclosure in cases of “grave endangerment of the security of a witness or his or her 
family”); ICC R. P. & EVID. 81.3, 87–88; ICTY R. P. & EVID. 69(a) (authorizing nondisclosure of 
the witness’s or victim’s identity “[i]n exceptional circumstances” where that person “may be in 
danger or at risk”). Thus, prosecutors may well disclose evidence that leads to witness 
intimidation or tampering. 
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(Nov. 30, 2007); Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the 
Practices of Witness Familiarisation and Witness Proofing, at 21–22 (Nov. 8, 2006) (barring the 
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state’s hands. For example, only days after the ICTY convicted a 
Bosnian Croat general of atrocities, Croatia turned over thousands of 
pages of potentially exculpatory evidence, leading the Appeals 
Chamber to overturn sixteen of his nineteen convictions.248 (The 
potential for delay and manipulation of the judicial system is 
obvious.) Similar problems arise in the United States’ fragmented 
federal system. Courts charge American prosecutors with a 
constitutional duty to inquire of investigators from the same 
jurisdiction, holding them liable for what they knew or should have 
known.249 Unfortunately, this standard focuses on the prosecutor’s 
knowledge and actions, not on the defendant’s innocence. At the very 
least, international prosecutors should face the same standard, 
bearing a burden to investigate what they should know instead of 
hiding behind lack of actual knowledge. Better cooperation between 
states and law-enforcement agencies could also make more 
information from various states available to prosecutors. Ideally, the 
cautionary lesson of America’s flawed approach would lead 
international courts to adopt a tougher standard. At least for 
powerfully exculpatory evidence, the standard should focus not on 
the prosecutor’s actus reus or mens rea but on whether the evidence 
creates a strong doubt about guilt. The focus should be not on 
punishing prosecutors for violating the rules of an adversarial game 
but on freeing defendants who are likely innocent.250 
A related problem that arises in discovery is that nations 
sometimes share information with international prosecutors on 
condition that they not disclose the information. These nondisclosure 
provisions collide with defendants’ need to know, investigate, and 
rebut the evidence against them. If the material is inculpatory, of 
course, the prosecution cannot use it without getting the supplier’s 
consent and providing it to the defendant in advance of trial.251 But if 
the withheld material is exculpatory, a state’s refusal to share 
information could lead to convicting the innocent. In the ICC case of 
Thomas Lubanga, for example, the Prosecutor had received possibly 
 
 248. Gordon, supra note 232, at 678–79. 
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exculpatory evidence under a confidentiality agreement and withheld 
it from the defense.252 To solve this problem, prosecutors should have 
to submit confidential exculpatory or impeachment evidence to the 
court for in camera review; the court could then dismiss charges or 
overturn convictions if the evidence creates a reasonable doubt about 
guilt. Domestic prosecutors already do this with information that may 
or may not qualify as exculpatory.253 Confidentiality agreements that 
preclude even in camera review by courts raise even more serious 
issues. Prosecutors should reject these restrictive agreements, even 
though that may limit their access to both inculpatory and 
exculpatory evidence.254 
C. Trial Procedures 
International trial procedures also could learn from domestic 
guarantees of speedy trials and cross-examination. One important 
development would be to add teeth to speedy-trial requirements. 
Defendants, many of whom are detained without bail, can languish in 
jail for years awaiting justice although they are presumed innocent. 
Victims and the public likewise have strong interests in seeing justice 
done quickly so they can begin to heal. The ICTY and Rome Statutes 
guarantee defendants speedy trials. Yet, in practice, courts uphold 
years-long delays.255 Though recent procedural reforms have tried to 
speed trials,256 there is still much room to improve. Before trial, judges 
need to enforce strict schedules and use plea bargaining to clear their 
dockets for the most important trials. At trial, judges need to exercise 
their powers to limit the number of witnesses and the length of their 
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testimony.257 The Nuremberg trials began less than seven months after 
the Allies’ victory in Europe; within a year, they had convicted or 
acquitted all twenty-two defendants and executed those sentenced to 
death.258 True, most states now accord defendants somewhat more 
procedural rights than they did sixty years ago. Nevertheless, fairness 
and justice should be measured in months, not years. 
Another important issue is the admissibility of written 
statements. As mentioned, inquisitorial systems charge judges and 
police with investigating even-handedly and make their transcripts 
admissible, at least when witnesses are unavailable. Adversarial 
systems, in contrast, do not trust pretrial investigations conducted by 
partisan advocates. Instead, all witness evidence must be live 
testimony at trial, so that the other side can cross-examine it to probe 
its weaknesses. International criminal justice lacks neutral 
investigating magistrates, whose pretrial questioning one could trust 
to be even-handed. Though it lacks this inquisitorial safeguard, it also 
dispenses with the adversarial requirement of cross-examination in all 
cases. ICC and ICTY rules allow the parties to submit documentary 
evidence and written statements, not subject to cross-examination, on 
peripheral issues other than “the acts and conduct of the accused.”259 
It makes sense to admit uncontested hearsay on background matters 
such as the existence of a war in the Balkans or the demographics of 
an area’s inhabitants. As long as the other side has adequate notice 
and a right to rebut, these measures can speed trials past uncontested 
jurisdictional elements and peripheral issues. Unfortunately, in their 
efforts to speed and streamline trials, these courts have gone too far. 
They have admitted testimony of witnesses from prior trials against 
other defendants to prove a current defendant’s mens rea.260 Neither 
inquisitorial, even-handed questioning nor adversarial cross-
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examination has probed the weaknesses of evidence so central to the 
prosecution’s case. Each side needs to be able to insist on live 
testimony that it can cross-examine, except when it has previously 
cross-examined the same witness at a deposition or perhaps when the 
witness has died. 
D. Victims’ Rights 
A final concern is that international procedure is not sensitive 
enough to victims’ needs and concerns. If the main purpose of 
international justice is to restore wounded communities and heal 
victims, then victims need to feel that the system takes them seriously, 
listens to them, and gives them opportunities to release their anguish, 
bitterness, and grief. All too often, international law’s technicalities 
and the physical distance of Hague-based trials from victims 
exacerbate victims’ disconnection from proceedings and outcomes. 
To be fair, international procedures evince some solicitude for 
victims. The ICTY and ICC have victim-witness offices to counsel and 
protect victims’ privacy and safety,261 and also facilitate reparations 
and compensation.262 But the ICTY’s procedures guarantee victims no 
notice or consultation about bail, guilty pleas, trial, or sentencing. The 
ICC goes further.263 It allows victims to hire legal representatives, who 
may, if the court permits, make opening and closing statements and 
question witnesses.264 It requires notifying victims of decisions not to 
investigate or prosecute or to confirm charges. Those who apply to 
the court to participate through legal representatives are notified of 
later proceedings and discovery, and the court may choose to solicit 
their views on other matters.265 Early ICC decisions suggest that the 
court will interpret “victims” broadly and grant them considerable 
influence.266 
If domestic practice is any indication, however, the grand 
rhetoric of victim participation outstrips reality. In practice, despite 
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broad victims’ rights laws, many crime victims fail to receive notice.267 
Although they are better than nothing, a legal representative’s 
motions and questions are no substitutes for the victim’s own day in 
court.268 At the very least, victims should be able to watch proceedings 
on television. Ideally, they should have some opportunity to speak or 
at least submit their stories in writing. Of course, victim participation 
is in tension with keeping trials short and swift, particularly because 
genocides harm hundreds or thousands of victims. But there are ways 
to incorporate American victims’-rights experiments into 
international justice without bogging down the system. Perhaps 
victims could submit video victim-impact statements at sentencing. 
Integrating international criminal trials with local restorative justice 
efforts would let more victims take part by telling their stories to 
defendants in restorative-justice conferences afterwards, without 
compromising the speed of trials. Simply giving victims these 
cathartic, expressive opportunities would take them seriously and 
help them to heal. Plea and sentencing procedures could push for and 
reward unequivocal admissions of guilt, remorse, and even 
apologies.269 Unequivocal admissions of guilt vindicate victims, open 
the door to forgiveness, and set the historical record straight, 
precluding Holocaust denials. Conversely, judges and prosecutors 
should refuse to accept guilty plea allocutions that deny or minimize 
defendants’ acts or guilt or shift blame onto victims.270 Judges and 
prosecutors could even speak in less technical and more moralistic 
language at pleas and sentencing, clearly documenting and 
condemning atrocities for all to see. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Article has focused on the lessons that domestic criminal 
procedure can teach international procedure, in particular how 
domestic realism can temper international idealism. The numerous 
lessons range from case management to staffing, from budget 
allocations to procedural safeguards. As international criminal courts 
come of age and confront ever-growing caseloads, these domestic 
lessons can obviate reinventing the wheel, enhance efficiency, and 
make international criminal justice more just. 
Although we have focused on the lessons domestic criminal 
procedure can offer international criminal law, the comparison works 
the other way around as well. Domestic procedure has grown so 
cynical and amoral that it could profit from a dose of fresh 
international idealism. The lessons of international criminal law for 
domestic procedure merit a separate article, but we introduce three 
key themes here. 
First is the theme of transparency and political accountability. 
Domestic criminal procedure is opaque. Except for a few high-profile 
cases, there is little public scrutiny of charging and prosecuting 
decisions,271 leaving plenty of room for the agency costs of self-
interested lawyers.272 Plea bargaining behind closed doors resolves the 
vast majority of cases. In contrast, international tribunals are 
transparent and accountable. Every decision and transcript is posted 
for all to see. The prosecutor and presiding judge must report twice a 
year to the UN or the ASP and depend on state cooperation. NGOs 
and scholars dissect a tribunal’s every move. Although the resulting 
pressure can be problematic, it also makes the international system 
accountable. For example, when the ICC Prosecutor charged 
Lubanga only with conscripting child soldiers, the NGO community 
cried foul that other crimes—particularly rape and sex crimes—were 
neglected, forcing the Prosecutor to broaden his strategy.273 Granted, 
international criminal justice is easier to monitor: there are fewer 
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cases, they are much more serious, and they are highly salient, 
exciting public and media attention. Nevertheless, perhaps NGOs and 
reporting requirements could introduce more domestic transparency, 
making domestic criminal justice more accountable. 
Second is the goal of restoration. As we have discussed, the 
global context and atrocity focus make restorative justice particularly 
salient internationally. Victim participation, outreach to affected 
communities, and the linkage of formal trials and traditional justice 
mechanisms promise to enhance restoration. In contrast, domestic 
criminal law has largely neglected this restorative element, focusing 
instead on retribution and incapacitation. Though contexts differ, 
domestic criminal law could do more to emphasize restoration. For 
low-level domestic crimes, judicial processes could use informal social 
pressure and shame and seek to heal as much as punish. For more 
serious crimes, particularly hate and bias crimes, domestic law could 
involve victims more directly and supplement criminal trials with 
truth commissions or other restorative processes. 
Finally, although we have criticized overzealous idealism, its 
flipside—cynicism—is equally dangerous. Domestic prosecutors, 
judges, and defense lawyers are far too often cynical, jaded veterans 
who have lost their vision and motivation.274 International officials 
and NGOs, in contrast, are driven by strong idealism. We might even 
try to leaven domestic cynicism with a dose of international idealism. 
Perhaps more term limits, rotation in office, and rhetoric about justice 
can combat the world-weary cynicism that wears down zealous 
newcomers. A system less like a plea-bargaining assembly line and 
more like a morality play could better inspire the actors.275 Greater 
transparency and accountability might also motivate even cynical 
veterans to play their roles with gusto. 
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